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RECALIBRATING CONSTITUTIONAL INNOCENCE 
PROTECTION 
Robert J. Smith* 
Abstract: This Article examines the constitutional nature of the right of a prisoner to 
receive post-conviction relief based solely on the claim that he1 is innocent. Part I explores 
innocence protection as an animating value of constitutional criminal procedure (Part I.A) 
and describes how developments in the way that crimes are investigated, proved, and re-
examined have dislodged the trial from its place at the center of the constitutional criminal 
procedure universe (Part I.B). Part II explores how realigning the importance of innocence 
protection with the practical realities of our criminal justice system would impact the 
regulation of post-conviction procedures. It also is divided into two sections. Part II.A 
provides an overview of how the U.S. Supreme Court has treated innocence claims to date. 
First, it considers gateway innocence claims—those in which the prisoner asserts that new 
evidence of his factual innocence should permit substantive review of an otherwise defaulted 
claim that he received a constitutionally deficient trial. It also considers freestanding 
innocence claims—those in which a prisoner asserts that new evidence of his factual 
innocence warrants relief despite the fact that the conviction stemmed from a constitutionally 
sound trial. Part II.B articulates a three-tiered framework—conviction relief, execution relief, 
gateway innocence—for adjudicating such claims.  
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1. Throughout the Article, I use “he” and “his” because males are disproportionately represented 
in state and federal prison populations relative to their presence in the general population. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Society suffers thrice when it convicts an innocent person. First, as a 
retributive matter, the harm done to society has not been rectified but 
amplified. Second, the real perpetrator is still “out there,” which, from a 
public safety standpoint, might not seem significant in the context of 
small-time marijuana distribution or tax fraud, but means much more in 
the case of a murderer or serial rapist. Finally, when it convicts—and 
especially if it executes—an innocent person, society suffers in terms of 
both the perceived legitimacy of its power to allocate punishment and 
the criminal justice system’s competence to protect innocent citizens 
from unjust punishment. 
The Constitution’s Framers recognized the paramount importance of 
innocence protection. Though there is no text in the Constitution that 
reads, “Congress shall pass no law to convict an innocent person” in the 
same way that the First Amendment reads, “Congress shall pass no 
law . . . abridging speech,” innocence protection is an “axiomatic and 
elementary” value of constitutional criminal procedure.2 Its spirit 
animates the Fifth3 and Sixth Amendments.4 The lack of culpability that 
                                                     
2. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
3. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself . . . .”). 
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
 
09 - WLR March 2012 Smith Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2012 11:17 AM 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL INNOCENCE PROTECTION 141 
 
it represents serves as the baseline against which grossly 
disproportionate sentences are measured under the Eighth Amendment.5 
It is the reason for providing staples of due process such as the 
presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution 
prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.6 
The purpose of most innocence protection mechanisms is to guard 
against wrongful conviction at trial. This Article suggests the need to 
reconsider the trial as the center of gravity for innocence protection. At 
common law, a sentence was rendered shortly after the conviction.7 No 
real ability to house prisoners for long periods existed.8 Punishment was 
physically severe, but temporally limited.9 Even if a longer period of 
time between conviction and the completion of the punishment had 
existed at the founding, in a world without forensic science, the best 
evidence likely already had been introduced at trial. Traditional forms of 
evidence uniformly became less reliable following the trial.10 Witnesses 
died. Memories faded. Evidence decayed. Other societal interests, such 
as finality, comity, and judicial economy, weighed heavily against 
upsetting verdicts.11 
                                                     
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence.”). 
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
6. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding “that the Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary 
to constitute the crime with which he is charged”). The Court referred to the presumption of 
innocence as “that bedrock axiomatic and elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[O]ur Constitution was 
written at a time when delay between sentencing and execution could be measured in days or weeks, 
not decades.”) denying cert. to 721 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1998) and Moore v. Nebraska, 591 N.W.2d 86 
(Neb. 1999). 
8. See Adam J. Hirsch, From Pillory to Penitentiary: The Rise of Criminal Incarceration in Early 
Massachusetts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1982) (noting that “terms [of incarceration]” in the 
mid-eighteenth century “rarely exceeded three months, and often proved as fleeting as twenty-four 
hours”). 
9. See id.  
10. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 62 (1968) (noting the resolution of contested factual issues, 
such as those involving “claims of coerced confession,” becomes more challenging as time passes 
because “dimmed memories or the death of witnesses is bound to render it difficult or impossible to 
secure crucial testimony on disputed issues of fact”). “Postponement of the adjudication of such 
issues for years can harm both the prisoner and the State and lessens the probability that final 
disposition of the case will do substantial justice.” Id. “Even where resolution of constitutional 
claims turns on record evidence, loss or destruction of a relevant document or failure to transcribe 
the record over a period of years, could mean that a claim relegated to the limbo of prematurity 
might never be adequately determined.” Id. at n.16. 
11. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995) (underscoring that the “individual interest in 
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The balance of interests has shifted substantially over the past quarter 
century.12 A rapid escalation in the quality and quantity of scientific 
evidence, including new tools and modes of analysis, has meant that for 
the first time in history some forms of evidence can become more 
reliable with time. Meanwhile, the ability to house prisoners long-term 
has provided more of an opportunity for innocence to be discovered 
posttrial. The perceived reliability of traditional forms of evidence, such 
as eyewitness identification testimony and confessions, has diminished 
significantly. Worse, perhaps, social cognition research demonstrates 
that fact-finders sometimes assign probative force to, or misremember 
evidence based on, arbitrary factors such as race.13 The Framers could 
not have envisioned this altered criminal justice landscape. 
Nor could the Framers have foreseen the extent to which innocent 
citizens are convicted of crimes they did not commit. There have been 
289 DNA-based exonerations since 1989.14 Seventeen of those prisoners 
had been sentenced to death.15 When one considers both DNA and non-
DNA cases together, there have been more than 600 known wrongful 
convictions since 1973.16 One hundred forty of those exonerations 
involved citizens who had been sentenced to death.17 This is not a 
passing phenomenon. From eyewitness identification science18 to the 
diagnosis of shaken baby syndrome,19 there are fundamental flaws in the 
evidence that prosecutors regularly use to secure convictions. At the 
same time, overworked and underpaid defenders often are unable to 
                                                     
justice” is counter-balanced by these societal interests). 
12. See Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and Newly 
Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 688 (2005) (“Valuing 
finality and efficiency as assets in the world of post-trial litigation . . . does not mean they should 
trump competing policy objectives, particularly the accuracy of criminal adjudication.”).  
13. See, e.g., Justin Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, Implicit 
Racial Bias and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010) (discussed 
infra Part I.B.2.c); Justin Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision Making, and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) (discussed infra Part I.B.2.c). 
14. Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
15. Id.  
16. Samuel R. Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 173, 176 (2008) 
(reporting that there are “perhaps 600 to 700 exonerations of all types from across the country over 
a period of 35 years”). 
17. Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last updated Jan. 23, 2012).  
18. See infra Part I.B.2.a (discussing the questionable reliability of eyewitness identification 
evidence). 
19. See generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, The Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome 
and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
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thoroughly investigate solid pretrial claims of innocence.20 These 
developments signal that a substantial number of innocent women and 
men are residing within United States prison walls.21 
Just how substantial? Though he has emphasized that the full scope of 
the problem is “unknown and frustratingly unknowable,” Professor 
Samuel Gross has labeled the known cases of wrongful conviction as 
“the tip of the iceberg.”22 Professor Michael Risinger estimates the 
wrongful conviction rate at as high as five percent.23 At the other end of 
the spectrum, renowned district attorney Joshua Marquis estimates the 
wrongful conviction rate at .027%.24 In his concurring opinion in Kansas 
v. Marsh,25 Justice Antonin Scalia adopted the Marquis estimate—which 
he phrased as a 99.973% success rate.26 Assuming Marquis and Justice 
Scalia are correct that the wrongful conviction rate is only .027%, what 
does that mean in absolute terms? It may help to consider the analogy of 
plane crashes.27 Roughly 18,000 flights arrive or depart Atlanta’s 
                                                     
20. See Laurence A. Benner, When Excessive Public Defender Workloads Violate the Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel Without a Showing of Prejudice, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 
1 (Mar. 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/bennerib_excessivepd_workloads.pdf. In 
places like Florida, “the annual felony caseload of individual public defenders increased to 500 
felonies per year while the average for misdemeanor cases rose to an astonishing 2,225.” Id. 
“Caseloads are so excessive that . . . defense counsels are unable to perform core functions such as 
conducting an adequate factual investigation into guilt or innocence.” Id.  
21. See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S.__, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1551 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“Whether or not any innocent defendants have actually been executed, abundant evidence 
accumulated in recent years has resulted in the exoneration of an unacceptable number of 
defendants found guilty of capital offenses.”). 
22. Samuel R. Gross, Souter Passant, Scalia Rampant: Combat in the Marsh, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
FIRST IMPRESSIONS 67 (2006), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/105/gross.pdf. 
23. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780 (2007). Professor Risinger employed a 
database of 1980s capital rape-murder cases and put the wrongful conviction rate at 3.3% in those 
types of cases. Id. at 778. He then extrapolated from those cases to reach the 5% figure. Id. at 779–
80. 
24. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Joshua Marquis, 
The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at A23 (treating .027% as a high-ball 
estimate of the wrongful conviction rate)); see also id. (citing Joshua Marquis, The Myth of 
Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501, 518 (2005) (suggesting that those who estimate the 
wrongful conviction rate based on exonerations exaggerate the number of released prisoners who 
were factually innocent)).  
25. 548 U.S. 163. 
26. Id. at 199 (Scalia, J., concurring) (referring to the number of wrongful convictions as an 
“insignificant minimum”). Justice Scalia further contends that no factually innocent person has been 
executed in recent times. Id. at 188 (“If such an event had occurred in recent years, we would not 
have to hunt for it; the innocent’s name would be shouted from the rooftops by the abolition 
lobby.”).  
27. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 127 (1998) (“Airplane crashes . . . are also rare; as passengers, we can feel 
comfortable telling ourselves and each other not to worry, that it will never happen. But engineers, 
traffic controllers, and pilots must not ignore crashes: They are terrible, tragic events, and they 
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Hartsfield–Jackson airport each week.28 If five of those planes crashed—
roughly .027% of flights—operations at the airport would cease 
immediately. So, too, would 125 people wrongfully imprisoned annually 
(.027% of all state court felony convictions) represent a disturbing 
number of wrongful convictions.29 
The rise of scientific evidence, the discovery of flaws in the 
traditional forms of evidence relied upon at trial, and the realization that 
our criminal justice system results in the conviction of innocent 
defendants in previously unimaginable numbers force a reexamination of 
how the aims of innocence protection fit with the practical realities of 
our criminal justice system. In other words, to preserve the position of 
innocence protection as a primary constitutional value, we need to 
reconsider the near singular focus on the trial as the setting where 
substantive innocence is best determined. This shift would reflect the 
reality that substantive innocence is often detected most accurately either 
before or after trial. 
Regulating pretrial procedures is key to reorienting innocence 
protection.30 Only six percent of state felony cases proceed to trial.31 
Moreover, as Justice Scalia noted in Marsh, the primary use for DNA 
evidence in criminal cases is as a “highly effective way to avoid 
conviction of the innocent.”32 Other scientific tests such as fingerprint 
analysis perform a similar screening function. The Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires prosecutors to turn over the 
results of such testing, if exculpatory.33 But, the evidence does not 
                                                     
remain rare precisely because as a society we do worry about them, and try to stop them from ever 
happening.”). 
28. Operating Statistics, HARTSFIELD-JACKSON ATLANTA INT’L AIRPORT, http://www.atlanta-
airport.com/Airport/ATL/operation_statistics.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2011) (listing 79,647 flights 
in June 2011).  
29. In 2004, there were roughly 500,000 felony convictions in state courts in the United States. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Court Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2004 – Statistical Tables, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. tbl.1.8 (2004), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04108tab.cfm. 
30. See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 
421, 422 (2003) (highlighting that “most criminal procedure scholars[] mistakenly view trials as the 
center of the universe and assume that rational suspects should care mainly about maximizing their 
chances of success at trial” and noting that “[t]his academic obsession with trials bears little 
relationship to the real world, where only about 6% of felony defendants go to trial and most plead 
guilty”). 
31. Sean Rosenmerkel et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006 
– Statistical Tables, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. 25 tbl.4.1 (Dec. 2009), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf (showing that six percent of state court felony 
convictions were achieved at trial). 
32. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 191 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
33. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976) (holding that prosecutors must turn over to 
the defense evidence “clearly supportive of a claim of innocence” regardless of whether the defense 
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always make its way into the defense counsel’s hands. Sometimes this is 
because prosecutors willfully refuse to turn over the evidence despite its 
exculpatory nature. Other times the prosecution does not test the 
evidence, or tests the evidence but believes in good faith that the results 
are not exculpatory. “Open-file” discovery can fix this non-disclosure 
problem. Under such a requirement, the prosecution must simply turn 
over all of its evidence regardless of whether or not the prosecutor 
believes it to be exculpatory.34 The issue has gained little traction with 
the Court to date. However, when it is viewed through an innocence 
protection lens and in light of the new pretrial center of gravity in 
criminal cases, open-file discovery—at least for materials subject to 
biological testing—obtains a new constitutional dimension.35 
                                                     
requests the evidence); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that “the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution”). 
34. See Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1557 (2010) 
(defining “open file” discovery as a process “where prosecutors must turn over all evidence known 
to the government, exculpatory and inculpatory alike” (emphasis in original)).  
35. Id. at 155758 (“Some commentators have pushed for a federal constitutional doctrine of 
open file discovery to realize Brady’s idealistic vision.”); id. at 1558 n.138 (citing Robert P. 
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The 
Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 262 (2008)). 
Two other ramifications of an innocence-protection framework are fruitful areas for future 
scholarship. First, aligning innocence protection with the realities of the modern criminal justice 
system would also require reframing the Sixth Amendment doctrine regarding interrogations. 
Absent a specific request for counsel in the context of a custodial interrogation, law enforcement is 
free to approach and interrogate any suspect. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 
2079, 298687, 2091 (2009) (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986), which 
forbade police-initiated “interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar 
proceeding, of his right to counsel”). This scenario is especially plausible in the context of a suspect 
who has committed some crime, but not the crime charged (e.g., manslaughter versus first degree 
murder). This rule reflects the Court’s understanding of a lawyer’s role in a pretrial interrogation as 
merely helping to enforce the client’s right to remain silent. In actuality, the counsel’s presence can 
protect the innocent accused from making statements that can be interpreted as incriminating. A 
person who relays a narrative of events does not necessarily know which particular facts are 
inculpatory. Sometimes, a detective suggests alterations to the narrative. This may be done in 
connection with intense hostility or misleading statements about the evidence in the case. In such a 
situation, an innocent defendant might accept the alternate version of events under the false 
impression that the altered facts have no bearing on the detective’s perception of his innocence. 
Skilled lawyers are able to referee this interaction between law enforcement and their clients, 
increasing the likelihood that innocent defendants are not pressured or tricked into making false 
inculpatory statements. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Criminal Justice Institute of Harvard Law 
School at 4, Montejo, 129 S. Ct. 2079 (No. 07-1529) (“Aside from the ultimate decision whether to 
plead guilty, there is perhaps no more critical stage in a criminal prosecution than a post-attachment 
encounter between a defendant and the government.”).  
Another area of improvement concerns the presumption that a prisoner received effective 
assistance of counsel in cases where the lawyer did not perform duties known to lower the risk of an 
erroneous conviction—for instance, failure to interview a credible alibi witness. Corroboration of 
snitch witness testimony, regulation of eyewitness identification procedures, and more rigorous plea 
colloquies are other areas that call for reconsideration to restore innocence protection to its place as 
 
09 - WLR March 2012 Smith Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2012 11:17 AM 
146 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:139 
 
A more fundamental piece of the innocence protection puzzle, 
however, is prisoners’ right to obtain relief upon a sufficient post-
conviction showing that they are factually innocent of the crime for 
which they were convicted. The bulk of this Article focuses on that 
element—the constitutional regulation of posttrial innocence claims. 
Though it might seem uncontroversial that prisoners who are able to 
establish their innocence to some predefined degree of certainty are 
entitled to relief, there is relentless debate over whether a court possesses 
the power to release prisoners who are able to demonstrate their factual 
innocence. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined to decide 
whether the Constitution prohibits the continued incarceration (or even 
the execution) of prisoners who are factually innocent of the crime for 
which they were convicted.36 
Absolute certainty is not a feature of many credible claims of 
innocence. Consequently, in the most difficult cases, society must 
engage in the distribution of risk. How much are we willing to risk 
protecting against the possibility that an innocent person remains 
incarcerated? How much are we willing to risk so that a guilty prisoner 
is not released? The uncertainty of innocence claims often makes these 
cases unattractive candidates for clemency. Moreover, elected state court 
judges may be reluctant to adjudicate such cases for fear of political 
backlash. However, it is in these cases—where the proof of innocence is 
strong but not ironclad—that we most need an answer to the question of 
whether the Constitution compels relief for a prisoner who is able to 
prove, to some predefined degree of certainty, that he is innocent of the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Part I of this Article explores innocence protection as an animating 
value of constitutional criminal procedure and describes how 
developments in the way that crimes are investigated, proved, and re-
examined have dislodged the trial from its place at the center of the 
constitutional criminal procedure universe. Part II explores how 
realigning innocence protection with the practical realities of the United 
States criminal justice system would impact the regulation of post-
conviction procedures. It provides an overview of how the Court has 
treated innocence claims to date. First, it considers gateway innocence 
claims. In such claims prisoners assert that new evidence of their factual 
innocence should permit substantive review of an otherwise defaulted 
                                                     
the primary motivating value of constitutional criminal procedure.  
36. See, e.g., Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321 
(2009) (referring to the existence of a “federal constitutional right to be released upon proof of 
‘actual innocence’” as an “open question”). 
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claim that they received a constitutionally deficient trial. Second, it 
examines freestanding innocence claims. In those claims, prisoners 
assert that new evidence of their factual innocence warrants relief 
despite the fact that the conviction stemmed from a constitutionally 
sound trial. Part II also articulates a three-tiered framework (conviction 
relief, execution relief, gateway innocence) for adjudicating both 
gateway and freestanding innocence claims.37 
I. INNOCENCE PROTECTION AND THE DECLINE OF THE 
TRIAL 
This part of the Article begins by exploring both innocence protection 
as a transcendent constitutional value and the fit between innocence 
protection and the trial mechanisms that put the value into effect. It then 
questions whether the trial is still the location where innocence 
protection is best accomplished. Specifically, it discusses: (1) several 
shifts in how crimes are investigated, prosecuted, and punished that alter 
the innocence protection calculus; (2) the diminished reliability of 
traditional forms of evidence presented at the trial; and (3) the increased 
availability and reliability of posttrial scientific evidence. Finally, it 
navigates the doctrinal possibilities for realigning innocence protection 
with the location (here, posttrial) and mechanisms (here, posttrial review 
of factual innocence claims) where its aims can best be met. 
A.  Innocence Protection Is a Transcendent Constitutional Value 
What follows is an overview of the constitutional basis for innocence 
protection before a person is convicted of a crime. This is the easiest and 
most obvious piece of the freestanding innocence puzzle. It provides a 
baseline understanding of the primacy of innocence protection as a value 
in constitutional criminal procedure and dispels the erroneous but often 
repeated assumption that the Constitution protects the innocent with 
                                                     
37. Under the proposal described infra Part II.B, in order to get a new trial, a petitioner must 
present “clear and convincing” evidence that he is innocent of the underlying crime. Because a 
death sentence is different in kind than any other punishment, however, and because the possibility 
of presenting future evidence that provides a conclusive showing of innocence is irrelevant once the 
person has been executed, a lesser showing of probable innocence should bar execution. Finally, the 
standard for so-called gateway innocence claims (e.g., where proof of innocence is sufficient to 
forgive ordinary procedural impediments to the review of constitutional claims) should be lowered 
to a “reasonable probability” standard. In exchange for the reduction in the quantum of evidence 
required, the underlying constitutional issues that can be raised under the gateway innocence 
exception should be restricted to those most likely to have an impact on the guilt–innocence 
determination. This alteration brings the exception in line with the overriding innocence-protection 
framework.  
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equal gusto regardless of when the fact of innocence is uncovered. The 
rest of this Article reaches back to this foundation as it attempts to define 
what innocence protection means after a conviction and how to allocate 
risk when determining the appropriate remedies for post-conviction 
innocence claims. 
Protecting from conviction those who are factually innocent38 of the 
crime charged is an “axiomatic and elementary” value infused 
throughout constitutional criminal procedure.39 In Berger v. United 
States,40 the Court emphasized that the “twofold aims” of the criminal 
justice system are “that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.”41 
Similarly, across his substantial and widely recognized scholarship on 
the first principles of constitutional criminal procedure, Professor Akhil 
Amar has identified “protection of innocence” and “pursuit of the truth” 
as the two “deep principles underlying . . . constitutional criminal 
procedure.”42 The spirit of innocence protection informs the Fourth 
Amendment,43 drives the Fifth44 and Sixth Amendments,45 and anchors 
                                                     
38. Factual innocence, meaning that the prisoner took no part whatsoever in the crime, differs 
from innocence in the sense that the underlying factual basis for a sentence no longer exists. 
However, these two conceptions of innocence are at the very least close cousins. See Dretke v. 
Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 396 (2004) (noting conflicting circuit court treatment on the question of 
whether a non-capital offender can establish a gateway innocence claim, and highlighting the 
“difficult questions regarding the scope of the actual innocence exception itself”); Lee Kovarsky, 
Death Ineligibility and Habeas Corpus, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 329 (2010) (arguing that the Court 
should entertain freestanding death-ineligibility claims).  
39. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
40. 295 U.S. 78 (1935). 
41. Id. at 88. 
42. Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 642 (1996); id. at 643 
(“Many parts of the Amendment, rightly read, do not protect only innocents, but they do protect 
only innocence; they protect the guilty only as an incidental by-product of protecting the innocent 
because of their innocence. Put another way, although the guilty will often have the same rights as 
the innocent, they should never have more, and never because they are guilty.” (emphasis in 
original)); see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975) (“We are, after all, always engaged in 
a search for truth in a criminal case so long as the search is surrounded with the safeguards provided 
by our Constitution.”). 
43. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1477 (1996) (describing the “Innocence model” as one of 
the three main constructs for interpreting the Fourth Amendment); id. at 1463–64 n.24 (citing 
Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246, 310 (1818)); Arnold Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As a 
Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229 (1983) (identifying innocence protection 
as the primary purpose to be served by the Fourth Amendment).  
44. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 904 (1995) (“The Self-Incrimination Clause, as best 
read, is designed to protect a truly innocent defendant who might be made to look guilty on the 
stand by a clever prosecutor skilled in technical courtroom procedure and forensics. To infer guilt 
from mere in-court silence would seem to betray the innocent but unpersuasive defendant whom the 
clause seeks to protect.”).  
45. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 42, at 661 (“[A]ccusation and indictment shove a person onto a 
legal road whose destination can never be certain even for the innocent man. At the end of this road 
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both the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality principle46 and the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.47 
Mechanisms that protect innocence by enhancing the trial verdict’s 
validity were built into the Bill of Rights. For example, in the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, the Framers believed cross-
examination to be the best mechanism for assessing the truth or falsity of 
witness testimony.48 In turn, maximizing the reliability of witness 
testimony serves the value of innocence protection by enhancing the 
fact-finder’s ability to render a reliable trial verdict.49 Innocence 
protection similarly guides the right to be tried by an impartial jury of 
one’s peers. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Duncan v. Louisiana,50 
“[t]hose who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience 
that [the jury trial right] was necessary to protect against unfounded 
criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too 
responsive to the voice of higher authority.”51 With regard to the right to 
counsel, the Court in Powell v. Alabama52 explained that the accused 
“requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings 
against him,” because “[w]ithout it, though he be not guilty, he faces the 
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his 
innocence.”53 The Constitution deploys these rules, among others, as 
part of a trial framework that is meant to facilitate accurate guilt 
determinations. 
                                                     
may hang a noose . . . . [M]uch of the . . . Sixth Amendment was designed to reduce the risk that a 
noose would be wrapped around an innocent neck . . . .”). But see Carol Steiker, First Principles of 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, A Mistake?, 112 HARV. L. REV. 680, 688 (1999) (“[T]he 
various factual situations that can arise under the constitutional provisions at issue and the multiple 
values that are plausibly promoted by these provisions are not easily reduced to one or two general 
principles, however simple or normatively attractive those principles might be.”). 
46. See infra notes 141–157 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Amendment).  
47. The presumption of innocence and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, discussed infra at 
notes 54–59 and accompanying text, are examples of procedural due process protections. See also 
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1983) (noting that the Due Process Clause requires 
“fundamental fairness” including the right to present a defense and the right to access exculpatory 
and material evidence, and highlighting that “[t]aken together, this group of constitutional privileges 
delivers exculpatory evidence into the hands of the accused, thereby protecting the innocent from 
erroneous conviction and ensuring the integrity of our criminal justice system”). 
48. See Crawford v. Washington, 501 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (finding that the “ultimate goal” of the 
Sixth Amendment is to “ensure reliability” and explaining that the specific prescription of 
confrontation “reflects a judgment” that cross-examining is “how reliability can best be 
determined”).  
49. See id.  
50. 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
51. Id. at 156. 
52. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
53. Id. at 69.  
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The pursuit of truth, the quest to convict the guilty, and the aim of not 
convicting the innocent generally converge. However, the fact that 
substantive and procedural regulations cannot guarantee accurate 
criminal-liability determinations requires assigning comparative weight 
to these core values. In other words, the impossibility of an error-proof 
trial forces the question of how much we are willing to risk that a guilty 
person goes free to increase the odds that an innocent person is not 
convicted. Both at common law and in contemporary practice, we 
privilege protecting innocence over the pursuit of truth or the goal of 
obtaining convictions against the guilty. As Blackstone noted, we 
presume that “it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one 
innocent suffer.”54 This presumption translates into both a baseline and a 
liability rule. First, the accused starts the trial presumed innocent. As the 
Court explained in In re Winship,55 because a defendant’s liberty is a 
“transcending value,” due process requires reducing the margin of error 
“by placing on the [prosecution] the burden of . . . persuading the 
factfinder.”56 Second, the government must establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged.57 The 
“demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was 
recurrently expressed from ancient times”58 and in its modern 
expression, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard “is a prime 
instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual 
error.”59 The presumption of innocence works in tandem with the 
reasonable doubt standard to privilege protecting the innocent over 
convicting the guilty. 
The goal of innocence protection, then, is infused with and 
inseparable from the constitutional criminal procedure amendments, 
where a bevy of procedural and substantive regulations aim to maximize 
                                                     
54. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (tracing the standard as far back as ancient Greece). 
55. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
56. Id. at 364 (second alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525–26 
(1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
57. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (underscoring that the “reasonable-doubt standard plays a 
vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 37 (1997) 
(“[M]ost people would agree that the system should seek to minimize convictions of innocent 
defendants. This preference for skewing the risk of error in the defendant’s favor does not apply to 
most constitutional claims, where the system can tolerate a much higher level of pro-government 
error: Better that an occasional Fourth Amendment violation or Batson claim be overlooked than 
that an occasional innocent defendant be imprisoned.”).  
58. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW 
OF EVIDENCE, § 321, at 681 (1954)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
59. Id. at 363. 
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the accuracy of trial verdicts.60 
B.  The Trial Is No Longer the Penultimate Place for Innocence 
Protection 
It is not controversial to suggest that the Constitution prohibits 
imprisoning or executing a person who is factually innocent—so long as 
the prosecution failed at the trial to rebut the presumption of innocence 
with proof beyond a reasonable doubt. What is controversial is the idea 
that factual innocence alone is enough to warrant relief from conviction 
after an otherwise sound trial. Resistance stems from the notion that the 
trial is the main event in criminal law.61 It is meant to be the definitive 
time and place to determine guilt or innocence. Thus, the “what” (e.g., 
right to counsel) and “why” (to facilitate accurate determinations of 
criminal liability) of innocence protection are attached to a “when” and a 
                                                     
60. This is not to suggest that recognizing innocence protection as a sort of constitutional trump 
card is without its critics. For instance, Professor Emily Hughes recently argued that the Court 
should not prioritize innocence over other types of constitutional error, and thus “innocence” should 
not be modified by terms such as “factual” or “actual.” See generally Emily Hughes, Innocence 
Unmodified, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (2011). Professor Hughes contends that the Court has diluted the 
concept of innocence by valuing “actual innocence over other constitutional rights, such as the 
effective assistance of counsel to explore exculpatory evidence, weaknesses in the government’s 
case, or other legal defenses that comprise an innocence unmodified.” Id. at 1119−20. The argument 
treats a person who committed the crime, but did not get a constitutionally sound trial, the same as a 
person who did receive a fair trial, but did not commit the crime. “Legal” and “actual” innocence 
are not equals, however. The procedural mechanisms required by the Bill of Rights (e.g., the right to 
receive exculpatory evidence from the prosecution or the right to the effective assistance of counsel) 
are meant to protect the factually innocent by maximizing the possibility that guilt is determined 
accurately at trial. Because the procedural rights are in service of the substantive value of innocence 
protection, it seems that a prisoner who is able to prove actual innocence without the necessity of 
fussing over legal innocence is in a stronger position than a person with a stronger claim of 
procedural error but a weaker (or, worse, non-existent) claim of underlying innocence.  
Professor Hughes focuses much of her argument on the context of guilty pleas, and she 
acknowledges that the prioritization of actual innocence might not be as problematic where 
defendants are represented by counsel. Other scholars have made the broader argument that 
innocence should not be prioritized over other types of constitutional error. See, e.g., Carol S. 
Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the 
Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
587, 610−11 (2005). Professor Hughes’s argument—which draws on these previous attempts—is a 
particularly concise and persuasive statement of the position. See Hughes, supra at 1083 (“Because 
the Innocence Movement has focused on defendants who did not commit the actions underlying 
their convictions, courts, lawyers, and the larger society have come to believe that a person is 
wrongly convicted of a crime only if he is actually innocent. This perception overlooks the fact that 
a person can be wrongly convicted if his constitutional rights were violated in the process. As such, 
the Innocence Movement devalues legal innocence and the constitutional values that underlie a 
broader conception of innocence.”).  
61. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993) (“[T]he trial is the paramount event for 
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.”); Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Lived 
Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1741 (2011) (“What is the purpose of a ‘trial’ worthy of the 
name, if not to allow a defendant a fair opportunity to show that he is innocent of the charges 
leveled against him?”). 
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“where” (at the time and place of the trial). 
However, once the trial is over and the prosecution has met its heavy 
burden, the presumption of innocence disappears. The accused is now 
the convicted. Considerations other than the interests of the convicted 
person come into play. The need for society to obtain finality in criminal 
judgments, to preserve scarce judicial resources, and to respect the 
judgment of other courts that decided the case must be factored into how 
we treat challenges to a conviction. The question at this stage is not 
whether the Constitution permits the incarceration or execution of an 
innocent person. Instead, the issue is whether the Constitution requires a 
court to revise a jury determination of guilt if the prisoner subsequently 
demonstrates his factual innocence to some predefined degree of 
certainty. 
This section demonstrates the need to reconsider the trial as the center 
of gravity in criminal prosecutions. The Framers did not—and could 
not—envision our modern criminal justice system, in particular the 
declining importance of the trial for substantive determinations of 
innocence. Yet, the Framers hardly could have made it more clear that 
innocence protection mechanisms (such as the right to confront 
witnesses) were integral to constitutional criminal procedure. We should 
apply that value system to our modern criminal justice system by 
relocating some of the conceptual importance of trial innocence 
protection mechanisms to the post-conviction context. Contemporary 
understanding of the scope of the wrongful conviction problem, as well 
as the increasing availability of tools that make assessments of certain 
types of evidence more reliable with time, require us to reconsider where 
we locate constitutional innocence protection. The Constitution cannot 
protect the innocent—a value of surpassing importance to the Framers—
unless it also provides a remedy for those discovered to be innocent (or 
very likely innocent) after a conviction has become final. The birth of 
long-term incarceration as a criminal justice tool, the expansion in time 
between the verdict and an execution in capital cases, the historical shift 
in the types of evidence relied on at trial, the rise of scientific evidence, 
and the vastly reconceptualized understanding of the possibility of 
incarcerating and executing innocent citizens support relocating some of 
the focus to the post-conviction context. 
It is important to note that these shifts functionally de-emphasize the 
trial as the place to determine innocence, but the change has not all been 
in the same direction. There are strong arguments for the notion that the 
pretrial process has displaced the trial as the main event when it comes 
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to innocence protection.62 The ability to test biological evidence 
pretrial—or to see a recording of the crime scene on a video camera or a 
cell phone—makes more objective what used to be determined primarily 
from the subjective testimony of fact witnesses. In many cases, the 
availability of objective evidence of innocence prevents erroneous 
arrests from occurring in the first place. The trial has been displaced as 
the main event in a much more fundamental way, though. Most of the 
action (and constitutional regulation) occurs pretrial—from litigating the 
admissibility of a confession, identification, or seized evidence to 
determining the scope of discovery. Indeed, despite (and probably 
because of) all of this pretrial noise, fewer than six percent of state 
felony cases proceed to trial.63 
This dislocation of the trial as the point of resolution of criminal 
claims has a profound impact on the ability to identify wrongful 
convictions. This is especially true in instances where defendants plead 
guilty, not because they are guilty, but because they are faced with what 
appears to be overwhelming evidence. Such people might decide to 
accept a comparatively lenient sentence if they (or their lawyer) are 
convinced that they will receive a harsher sentence at trial. This type of 
plea bargaining happens in the context of a modern system where 
outcomes are often constricted by sentencing guidelines: prosecutors can 
take advantage of the unprecedented breadth and overlap of modern 
criminal statutes to pile on multiple charges for a single incident,64 and 
overburdened public defenders simply may not have the time to 
thoroughly investigate—legally or factually—each case.65 With the 
understanding that the focus on the criminal case has shifted in the 
pretrial direction, the rest of this section explains why it is important to 
recognize that some of the shift has also moved in the posttrial direction. 
1. Changes in Investigative, Trial, and Sentencing Procedures 
Understanding the centrality of the trial for determining criminal 
                                                     
62. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in 
Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 475 (1996) (labeling a “miscarriage of justice as an error at 
trial . . . [is] a mistake” and noting that the “error occurs much earlier, in the investigation of the 
crime, when the police identify the wrong person as the criminal”). 
63. Matthew R. DuRose & Patrick A. Langan, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in 
State Courts, 2004, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. 1 (July 2007), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf. 
64. See HARVEY A. SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY: HOW THE FEDS TARGET THE 
INNOCENT (2009) (describing the proliferation of vague and broad federal laws and arguing that the 
federal criminal law covers more human activity than ever before). 
65. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
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liability requires imagining a wholly unfamiliar legal landscape. Long 
prison sentences did not exist at the founding. The most sophisticated 
mechanisms for holding lawbreakers were “primitive jails” described as 
“dirty, undisciplined, unisex warehouses in which every form and shape 
of humanity was shoved in, helter-skelter.”66 These jails could hold a 
very limited number of offenders, despite a growing urban population 
and an uptick in violent crime.67 Limited by the lack of technology 
necessary to house inmates long-term, punishments were physically 
brutal but temporally short.68 Modern prisons allow for the long-term 
incarceration of prisoners, which satisfies the public safety interest 
without the need to physically maim offenders. The time between 
conviction and execution in the capital context also has grown 
dramatically. At the founding, executions generally took place shortly 
after the sentence was handed down.69 The average capital inmate today 
spends years—or decades—on death row prior to execution.70 
Public investigations and interrogations also have changed shape, 
which has had a negative impact on the transparency of criminal 
prosecutions. As Professors D. Michael Risinger and Lesley Risinger 
have explained, police forces did not exist at the founding.71 Prosecutors 
likely did not prosecute or investigate most crimes.72 Complaining 
witnesses brought cases directly to a justice of the peace.73 Transcribing 
the witnesses’ statements and the statement of the accused occurred in 
the courthouse, not behind the closed doors of an interrogation room or 
                                                     
66. See Chris Hutton, A Glimpse of the Past: A Review of Lawrence Friedman’s Crime and 
Punishment in American History, 41 S.D. L. REV. 223, 224 (1996) (book review) (quoting 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77 (1983)). 
67. See Hirsch, supra note 8, at 1187 (noting that “terms [of incarceration]” in the mid-eighteenth 
century “rarely exceeded three months, and often proved as fleeting as twenty-four hours”); id. at 
1229 (noting, for example, that “[a]fter 1765, more than ten percent of the residents of Boston had 
lived in town for five years or less”); Michael J. Millender, The Road to Eastern State: Liberalism, 
the Public Sphere, and the Origins of the American Penitentiary, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 163, 168 
(1998) (book review) (noting, for example, the “alarming rise in crime rates” in 1786 Pennsylvania). 
68. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
69. Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and Execution Constitute 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147, 179 (1998) (noting that “[t]he time 
from the imposition of a death sentence to the execution was not long” in the post-revolution period, 
meaning that “if an execution occurred, it routinely happened within one year of the conviction”). 
70. Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment, 2009—Statistical Tables, 
U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. 14 tbl.12 (Dec. 2010), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp09st.pdf 
(noting, for example, that in 2009 the average length between sentence and execution was 169 
months).  
71. D. Michael Risinger & Lesley Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence into 
Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript 
at 8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1783941(follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink).  
72. Id. at 8−9. 
73. Id.  
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district attorney’s office.74 Moreover, the idea that the trial would 
provide adequate testing of innocence did not account for the private 
nature of the investigative process today, which gives prosecutors the 
ability to game the system both in the discovery process (e.g., whether to 
turn over exculpatory evidence) and in the investigatory process (e.g., 
how coercive is the interrogation).75 
Take the case of Connick v. Thompson.76 John Thompson spent 
eighteen years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary—most of them on 
death row—before his release in 2003.77 At his capital murder trial, 
Thompson opted not to testify in his own defense because he was 
previously convicted of armed robbery.78 The proof of his innocence of 
the armed robbery languished in the files of the New Orleans Crime 
Laboratory.79 One month before his scheduled execution a defense 
investigator stumbled upon a lab report indicating that the blood 
evidence the prosecution presented at trial did not match Thompson’s 
blood type.80 One assistant district attorney “intentionally suppressed 
[the] blood evidence” and then, shortly after being diagnosed with 
terminal cancer, confessed his wrongdoing to another assistant district 
attorney, who did not reveal the secret for another five years.81 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court vacated both convictions.82 Upon his release, 
the Jefferson Parish District Attorney retried Thompson for capital 
murder.83 A jury acquitted him.84 
Setting aside the impossibility of blood testing at the time of the 
founding, the idea of the prosecution possessing hidden evidence would 
have been inconceivable when the Framers constructed the innocence 
protection mechanisms in the Constitution. Investigations were more 
public, and the adversarial process was accompanied by fewer incentives 
for gamesmanship by individual prosecutors whose reputations are not 
                                                     
74. Id. at 9. 
75. Professor William Stuntz noted that “the degree to which the sorting of defendants is done by 
prosecutors rather than by judges and juries” is an “important and underrated feature of our current 
system” because in a system where three in five arrestees in state felony cases are never 
incarcerated, “the prosecutor represents the best shot any defendant, guilty or innocent, has at a 
favorable outcome.” Stuntz, supra note 57, at 45−46. 
76. 563 U.S.__,131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
77. Id. at 1355. 
78. Id.  
79. Id.  
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 1356 n.1; In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1242 (La. 2005). 
82. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 1355. 
83. Id. at 1357. 
84. Id. 
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won or lost by how fairly they treat accused citizens.85 A pessimistic 
view of how prosecutors decide whether to disclose potentially 
exculpatory material today might turn on maximizing how many 
convictions they can obtain within the outer limits of their ethical duties 
to disclose favorable information to the defense.86 
2. Erosion of Confidence in Determinations of Criminal Liability 
The realization that criminal verdicts are not foolproof, and indeed, 
that hundreds of people have been wrongly convicted, has led legislators 
and judges to reflect on the errors that occur in the trial process that can 
lead to wrongful convictions. The questionable reliability of two forms 
of evidence in particular—eyewitness identifications and confessions—
erodes the strong assumption of accuracy that the Framers placed in the 
trial itself.87 This section discusses each in turn. 
a.  Eyewitness Identification. 
Almost four-fifths of the first 200 prisoners exonerated by DNA 
evidence were convicted based on erroneous eyewitness identification.88 
Numerous studies over the past two decades have found that 
eyewitnesses do not reliably identify strangers.89 Accuracy does not 
appear to improve significantly when eyewitnesses are asked to identify 
                                                     
85. See supra notes 71−74 and accompanying text. This Article does not argue that trial outcomes 
were more reliable or that criminal justice actors (including magistrates) were filled with more 
integrity at any previous point in history. The idea that the process was more public than it is today, 
and the absence of knowledge that individual prosecutors who make decisions in private would 
dominate criminal cases, changes the calculus by providing more of a possibility that there is 
undisclosed evidence that might surface at some future point. 
86. The more opaque nature of the process today, and its unforeseen dominance by individual 
prosecutors who make decisions in private, changes the calculus by providing more of a possibility 
that there is undisclosed exonerating evidence that might surface after trial. 
87. Other forms of error—such as incorrect serology or fiber analysis—led to a greater number of 
exonerations among the first 200 DNA-based cases. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 77 tbl.3 (2008). My point, however, is that confession and eyewitness 
identification evidence were staple forms of evidence at the creation of our constitutional criminal 
procedure. It is the erosion of confidence in these traditional forms of evidence that would have 
surprised the Framers (as it continues to surprise Americans more than 200 years later).  
88. Id. (“The vast majority of the exonerees (79%) were convicted based on eyewitness 
testimony.”). Professor Garrett explains that in crimes such as rape, eyewitness identifications are 
often central to the prosecution’s case. See id. at 79. The point is not the eyewitness identifications 
should be excluded from trial, but rather that the frequent errors that accompany such testimony 
counsel less deference towards trial verdicts in the face of a strong showing of innocence post-
conviction.  
89. Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering Uncorroborated 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1497 (2008) (collecting studies 
and concluding that “[e]yewitness identifications are notoriously subject to error”).  
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acquaintances, rather than strangers.90 The reliability of eyewitness 
identification evidence is diminished further still when the identification 
is interracial.91 Indeed, neuroscience research suggests that particular 
segments of the brain that mediate recognition simply do not work as 
hard when confronted with a person of a different race.92 The 
background conditions in which the identification is made—variations in 
weather, lighting, and distance, for example—also decrease the 
reliability of identifications.93 So do stressful situations, which, given the 
context, is particularly troubling in criminal cases.94 Taken together, the 
developments cast considerable doubt on the foundational assumption 
that a person—especially an uninterested party—would not testify that 
he saw someone “do it” unless he really did “do it.” 
b.  False Confessions 
In Arizona v. Fulminante,95 the Court emphasized: “A confession is 
like no other evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is 
probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted 
against him.”96 Concurring in Fulminante, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
agreed: “Apart, perhaps, from a videotape of the crime, one would have 
difficulty finding evidence more damaging to a criminal defendant’s 
plea of innocence.”97 Knowledge of false confessions existed at common 
law. The prototypical example was a confession in a murder case where 
                                                     
90. Kathy Pezdek & Stacia Stolzenberg, Non-Stranger Identification: How Accurately Do 
Eyewitnesses Determine If a Person is Familiar 2 (July 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1433127 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink) (“An eyewitness’s 
report that he can recognize a perpetrator because he has seen him casually in the past is of dubious 
reliability.”).  
91. See Thompson, supra note 89, at 1501 n.69 (citing ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS 
TESTIMONY 21 (1979)). 
92. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLUM. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 178, 193–94 (2007) (“[F]or most people, when they are observing faces, there is 
greater activity in the fusiform region of the brain (which is the region in which face recognition 
takes place) when a person tries to recognize a person of the same race as when he or she tries to 
recognize a person of another race.”). 
93. See generally Steven G. Fox & H.A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert 
Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 215 
(1986) (discussing physical factors that affect the reliability of eyewitness identification, including 
lighting and distance).  
94. See generally Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High 
Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687 (2004) (reporting a consensus among 
experts that high levels of stress negatively impact the ability of an individual to make a reliable 
eyewitness identification). 
95. 499 U.S. 279 (1991). 
96. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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the victim later appeared alive and well.98 To protect against such 
scenarios, courts required the prosecution to present independent 
evidence that a crime had occurred.99 The experience of the last two 
decades, however, has demonstrated that the problem is of a different 
degree than previously imagined. 
A sizable number of those individuals who have been exonerated by 
DNA evidence—including cases where the real perpetrator has been 
located—confessed to the crime. Professors Richard Leo and Steve 
Drizin have identified thirty-eight proven post-conviction exonerations 
where the wrongfully convicted person falsely confessed to committing 
the crime.100 In twenty-five of the cases, either the real perpetrator has 
been located or it was physically impossible for the person who 
confessed to have committed the crime.101 There are a number of factors 
that contribute to false confessions: youth and mental impairment; police 
deception during interrogations;102 confabulation;103 and an accused’s 
intentional or inadvertent mention of facts of the crime.104 The 
devastating nature of the modern understanding of false confessions is 
not only that they exist in larger numbers than assumed, but also that 
average defendants—not just the severely mentally ill or those who have 
been coerced—give false confessions. 
                                                     
98. Eugene R. Milhizer, Confessions After Connelly: An Evidentiary Solution for Excluding 
Unreliable Confessions, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2008) (discussing Perry’s Case, 14 How. St. Tr. 
1311 (1660), “which resulted in the execution of a defendant who had confessed to murdering a 
victim who was later discovered to be alive”). 
99. See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 86 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“The . . . rule 
[requiring external proof that a crime has occurred] guarded against the shocking spectacle and 
deleterious effect upon the criminal justice system when a murder victim suddenly reappeared, hale 
and hearty, after his self-confessed murderer had been tried and executed.”). 
100. Richard Leo & Steven Drizin, Proven False Confession Cases, Post-Conviction, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Master_List_False_Confessions.html (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2012).  
101. Id.  
102. For example, “we have DNA evidence that links you to the crime.” See, e.g., Miriam S. 
Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of 
Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 813, 824 (2006). “[T]he growing 
body of empirical evidence [demonstrates] that law enforcement trickery plays a significant role in 
false confessions . . . .” Id. at 796. 
103. Confabulation is the process whereby the brain remembers events that did not happen, often 
in response to excessive pressure and exhaustion. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 475 (2002). 
104. See Samuel R. Gross & Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: 
Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927, 
930−31 (2008) (“It is entirely possible that most wrongful convictions—like 90 percent or more of 
all criminal convictions—are based on negotiated guilty pleas to comparatively light charges, and 
that the innocent defendants in those case received little or no time in custody.”). 
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c.  Misremembering and Misinterpreting Evidence 
Implicit social cognition is the process by which the brain makes 
rapid and near automatic judgments about target objects, including 
people, on the basis of structures of knowledge that might not be 
consciously accessible.105 Implicit race bias is one form of implicit social 
cognition. Two implicit racial bias studies by Professor Justin Levinson 
further erode the perception that criminal liability is determined most 
reliably at trial.106 Levinson and Young tested whether implicit race bias 
impacts jurors’ interpretation of ambiguous evidence.107 Levinson 
provided a group of participants with a brief background story of a 
fictional mini mart robbery and then had the participants view three 
pictures from the crime scene for four seconds each. The first and 
second pictures were innocuous. The third picture—the centerpiece of 
the study—displayed one masked assailant reaching over the counter 
with a gun in his left hand. The only identifiable race cue of the assailant 
is a small section of visible flesh on his forearm. Levinson altered the 
skin tone of the assailant, showing half the participants a light-skinned 
suspect and the other half a dark-skinned suspect. After watching the 
short video, participants were told that a suspect was caught, and then 
provided with a series of ambiguous evidence about the suspect. 
Levinson asked the participants to rate the probative value of each piece 
of ambiguous evidence. Participants shown the photo with the dark-
skinned suspect were significantly more likely to find ambiguous 
evidence to be more probative of guilt. 
Levinson also conducted an elegant experiment to test whether 
implicit race bias impacted jurors’ memories of case facts.108 Levinson 
provided jury-eligible participants with a fictional story about a 
confrontation between two men. Some jurors read about “William” the 
white defendant, while others read about “Tyronne” the black defendant. 
The rest of the story remained constant. But when Levinson asked jurors 
to remember pertinent facts from the confrontation, he found that the 
race of the defendant affected how participants recalled the story’s 
details. Participants more frequently remembered aggressive details 
                                                     
105. FAQs: What Is the Difference Between ‘Implicit’ and ‘Automatic’?, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq5 (last visited Jan. 26, 2012). 
106. Levinson & Young, supra note 13; Levinson, supra note 13. The two paragraphs 
summarizing the Justin Levinson studies originally appeared in substantially similar form in G. Ben 
Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 WASH. L. REV. 
425 (2010).  
107. See Levinson & Young, supra note 13, at 332–39 (describing the study and its results). 
108. Levinson, supra note 13, at 390–406 (describing the study and its results). 
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when Tyronne rather than William was the defendant. Levinson 
concluded “that the race of a civil plaintiff or a criminal defendant can 
act implicitly to cause people to misremember a case’s facts in racially 
biased ways.”109 The participants appeared to remember “facts” that did 
not appear in the story more often when those facts were stereotype-
consistent, such as facts that portray black males as aggressive.110 
Other social cognition research demonstrates that people make the 
same type of biased decisions on the basis of age,111 gender,112 and 
weight,113 among other characteristics. The point is not that criminal 
liability is determined inaccurately in most cases—there is no basis for 
that belief. In close cases, this type of implicitly biased decision-making 
can swing determinations of witness credibility or the probative force of 
a piece of evidence, and thus make the difference between a guilty 
verdict and a not guilty verdict. More broadly, implicit bias is another 
signal that the singular focus on the trial as the “portentous event” in a 
criminal case is misplaced. 
3. Changes in the Availability and Reliability of Post-Conviction 
Evidence 
Scientific evidence is admitted into the courtroom in a large number 
of trials, especially in cases that involve serious crimes such as rape and 
murder. Unlike witness memory, the invention of new tools and modes 
of analysis sometimes means that scientific evidence can improve with 
time. For example, DNA technology today can analyze the same 
droplets of blood that state-of-the-art technology ten years ago could not 
analyze due to limited sample size or degradation.114 Thus, DNA 
evidence “provide[s] powerful new evidence unlike anything known 
before,” and “no technology [is] comparable to DNA testing for 
                                                     
109. Id. at 350.  
110. Id. at 398–406. 
111. See, e.g., Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic 
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 801 (2001) (“[I]mplicit group preferences captured by the 
IAT reliably predict people’s membership in various groups on the basis of the following 
characteristics: (a) race/ethnicity; (b) nationality; (c) age; (d) sex . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
112. Id.  
113. See, e.g., BA Teachman & KD Bronwell, Implicit Anti-Fat Bias Among Health 
Professionals: Is Anyone Immune?, 25 INT’L J. OBESITY 1525 (2001) (finding that health 
professionals possess negative implicit attitudes towards overweight citizens).  
114. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1658–59 (2008). 
“DNA technology has eroded the twin pillars supporting the Court’s ruling in Herrera: reliability 
and finality.” Id. at 1636. 
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matching tissues when such evidence is at issue.”115 However, DNA is 
not the only forensic science specialty with the power to shine light on 
wrongful convictions. Indeed, multiple specialties are undergoing rapid 
evolution.116 
On the other hand, forensic science is not perfect—despite the weight 
that juries tend to give to such evidence.117 Consider the Cameron Todd 
Willingham case. On February 17, 2004, moments before Texas 
executed Willingham, he uttered these last words: “I am an innocent 
man – convicted of a crime I did not commit. I have been persecuted for 
12 years for something I did not do.”118 A jury convicted Willingham 
and sentenced him to death in 1992 for the arson death of his three 
young children.119 Fire investigators determined that the fire was set 
intentionally because, among other things, the walls in the burned out 
Willingham home displayed unusual “pour patterns” and “puddle 
configurations,” which suggested the use of an accelerant to start the 
fire—or so the Texas deputy fire investigator testified at trial.120 
Four days before the execution, Willingham’s attorneys released a 
report by Gerald Hurst, a nationally acclaimed fire investigator, 
containing his conclusion that the arson investigation in the case was 
seriously flawed. Hurst noted that a reputable expert today might look at 
the initial report and wonder how someone could make so many “critical 
                                                     
115. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 557 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2317 (2009).  
116. Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second 
Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 728–30 (2007) (distinguishing between 
“first generation” forensic science specialties such as, “handwriting, fingerprinting, ballistics, bite or 
tool mark, and fiber analysis,” and “second generation” technologies such as, “DNA typing, data 
mining, location tracking, and biometric scanning” and suggesting that the latter group of specialties 
have the power to alter criminal adjudications in far-reaching ways).  
117. Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in 
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L. J. 1050, 1058 (2006) (describing the potential impact of television 
dramas such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation on juror perception of evidence quality and noting 
“the show’s plot twists often involve apparent victims who turn out to be the actual killers, 
alongside red herrings – those who confess despite their innocence, usually to save another”). Tyler 
asserts that “[t]he upshot of all this is that the investigators of CSI appear to place next to no faith in 
the credibility of the ordinary people with whom they talk. Rather than carefully weigh credibility, 
the investigators often seem to ignore the problem of determining whether or not someone is lying 
by instead going after ‘real’ evidence, like microfibers.” Id.  
118. Offender Information, TEXAS DEPARTMENT CRIM. JUST., 
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/dr_info/willinghamcameronlast.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) 
(providing the last statement of Cameron Todd Willingham). 
119. Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 
120. CRAIG L. BEYLER, ANALYSIS OF THE FIRE INVESTIGATION METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
USED IN THE CRIMINAL ARSON CASES AGAINST ERNEST RAY WILLIS AND CAMERON TODD 
WILLINGHAM 5–8 (2009), available at http://www.docstoc.com/docs/document-
preview.aspx?doc_id=10401390. 
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errors.”121 Hurst stated that the report and its findings “simply reflect[] 
the shortcomings in the state of the art” and thus are best viewed “in the 
context of its time and in light of a few key advances that have been 
made in the fire investigation field over the past dozen years.”122 He 
concluded that there was “nothing to suggest to any reasonable arson 
investigator that this was an arson fire.”123 Despite the report, the state 
and federal courts, as well as the Texas clemency process, failed to 
provide relief for Willingham. The Texas Forensic Science Commission 
later hired an expert, Craig Beyler, to investigate the case.124 In 2009, 
Beyler concluded that the original conclusions testified to at trial lacked 
any basis “in modern fire science,” and that the arson finding “could not 
be sustained.”125 Thus, Texas executed Cameron Todd Willingham 
despite highly convincing, but not certain, evidence of his innocence. 
Fire science is just one example of dozens of forensic science 
specialties where flaws in methodological assumptions have been 
exposed. Indeed, after a review of the trial transcripts from 137 DNA-
based exoneration cases in which a forensic science expert testified on 
behalf of the prosecution, Professor Brandon Garrett and Innocence 
Project Co-founder Peter Neufeld found that the expert offered 
“conclusions misstating empirical data or wholly unsupported by 
empirical data” in sixty percent of the cases.126 Furthermore, the 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a scathing report in 2009 
on the state of forensic science in America, concluding that “serious 
problems” exist and suggesting an “overhaul [to] the current structure 
that supports the forensic science community in this country.”127 Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,128 
highlighted “[s]erious deficiencies . . . in the forensic evidence used in 
criminal trials” and cited a recent study finding that “invalid forensic 
                                                     
121. GERALD HURST, REPORT OF DR. GERALD HURST 2–3 (2004), available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Willingham_Hurst_Report.pdf.  
122. Id. 
123. Steve Mills & Maurice Possley, Man Executed on Disproved Forensics, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 9, 
2004), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-0412090169dec09,0,1173806.story. 
124. Chuck Lindell, Man Was Executed over Arson That Wasn’t, Scientist Says, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Aug. 26, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/2009/08/26/0826arson.html. 
125. BEYLER, supra note 120, at 48–52. 
126. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful 
Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009). 
127. COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, at xx 
(2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE]. 
128. 557 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009). 
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testimony contributed to the convictions in 60% of [exoneration] 
cases.”129 One of the major problems that the NAS Report found, and 
Justice Scalia spotlighted, is that “[t]he majority of [laboratories 
producing forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement 
agencies, such as police departments, where the laboratory administrator 
reports to the head of the agency.”130 In other words, forensic science 
evidence is both inherently fallible and susceptible to the manipulation 
and frailties of human beings. Thus, forensic science evidence is a 
double-edged sword that both risks conviction of the innocent and 
contributes to the exoneration of wrongfully convicted inmates.131 
C.  Mechanisms for Realigning Constitutional Innocence Protection 
Shifts in the availability and reliability of scientific evidence force us 
to grapple with what substantive, doctrinal, or procedural mechanisms 
would best protect innocence outside of heightening the procedural 
protections available within the trial itself. There should be a 
constitutionally defined right to have a judge hear previously unheard 
evidence (or evidence that has been fundamentally altered due to new 
scientific analysis) at any point after the conviction has become final. 
This right holds regardless of whether a court has previously reviewed 
such a post-conviction claim so long as the new evidence meets 
predefined credibility and persuasion thresholds. Of course, the idea that 
changes in technology influence the mechanisms by which underlying 
constitutional values are enforced is not limited to the innocence context. 
Take the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
and seizures.132 Privacy was one important value that the Framers meant 
to protect.133 Until the mid-twentieth century, enforcing the value was 
                                                     
129. Id. at 2536. 
130. Id. at 2539 (alterations in original) (quoting STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 
127, at 183). 
131. It is also worth noting that errors that occur in relation to the use of modern forensic science 
tools can impact multiple cases at once. See Murphy, supra note 116, at 775 (“[T]he scale of error 
that can occur among second-generation [forensic science] techniques is an order of magnitude 
larger than that which occurred among the first-generation,” because, for example, “a wrongly 
calibrated machine can churn out large volumes of erroneous information and tarnish multiple 
cases.”). Murphy also noted the potential for error affecting multiple cases in DNA typing: “a 
manufacturer may contaminate a kit, an analyst may fail to run positive or negative controls, or a 
technician may erroneously input data into a database.” Id.  
132. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
133. Colb, supra note 43, at 1485. There is a strong argument that the Framers intended to 
“protect[] the innocent from invasions of privacy,” and because it is often impossible to sort the 
innocent from the guilty ex ante, “[t]he requirement of probable cause is simply a rough way of 
achieving this goal while permitting evidence-gathering to take place.” Id. at 1477. The 
“[i]nnocence model” of the Fourth Amendment “holds that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
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relatively straightforward.134 That has changed. As Justice Scalia wrote 
for the majority in Kyllo v. United States,135 “[i]t would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”136 To resolve the specific issue in Kyllo—whether a 
“thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to 
detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”—the Court centered its 
analysis on the value of privacy, noting that the home is the 
“prototypical . . . area of protected privacy.”137 Thus, technological 
change has required the Court to revise and devise doctrinal mechanisms 
in order to ensure that the Fourth Amendment continues to protect the 
core value of privacy. Similarly, the advent and pervasive nature of 
forensic evidence requires a doctrinal change to permit post-conviction 
process in order to best enforce innocence protection as a constitutional 
value. 
There is a strong basis for shaking loose the almost total focus on the 
trial as the place where innocence is best protected. The theoretical 
underpinnings for heavily distributing those protections at the trial level 
have been altered in the more than 200 years since the Framers crafted a 
constitutional criminal procedure.138 Investigations and interrogations 
are less public, long-time confinement is common, and there is a wider 
gap between trial and execution. At the same time, core assumptions 
about the reliability of the trial process have been called into serious 
question: eyewitness identifications are not always reliable, confessions 
are not always true (even in serious crimes, and even when the confessor 
is sane and has not been subjected to physical coercion), and fact-finders 
interpret the probative weight of evidence or misremember critical facts 
of the case based on arbitrary factors.139 Meanwhile, the capacity for 
post-conviction determinations of innocence has increased with changes 
in technology and law. Some forms of scientific evidence become 
                                                     
prohibition against unreasonable searches is to protect only those who are innocent and are not 
concealing evidence of crime from official searches.” Id. at 1463. 
134. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“The permissibility of ordinary visual 
surveillance of a home used to be clear because, well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.”). 
135. 533 U.S. 27. 
136. Id. at 33–34.  
137. Id. at 34. 
138. Indeed, our contemporary knowledge of wrongful convictions and their causes, as well as 
our ability to right these wrongs after the conviction has become final, has been radically altered 
even since the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution of the 1960s.  
139. See supra Part I.B.2.a–c. 
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reliable as time passes, especially as more sophisticated tools and 
methods are developed. At the same time, the availability of post-
conviction lawyers and forums allows tracking down previously 
unavailable evidence and witnesses. 
The remaining step is to identify the doctrinal structure in which the 
right to a post-conviction innocence determination is located. The Eighth 
Amendment is an obvious starting point because its proscription against 
“cruel and unusual punishment”140 is not static, but evolves to reflect 
modern sensibilities.141 The Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment applies to modes of punishment (e.g., drawing 
and quartering) and also to the fit between the punishment and the 
offender.142 The latter principle constrains extremely disproportionate 
sentences in both the capital and non-capital contexts. The Eighth 
Amendment might also prohibit the continued incarceration of factually 
innocent prisoners. The most poetic formulation of the inequity of 
wrongful imprisonment for any duration is found in Robinson v. 
California,143 where the Court invalidated a state statute that outlawed 
the status of being addicted to drugs: Though ninety days imprisonment 
is not cruel and unusual in the abstract, “[e]ven one day in prison would 
be cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having a common 
cold.”144 
In Graham v. Florida,145 the Court held that life without the 
possibility of parole is cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile who 
commits a non-homicide offense.146 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Graham Court emphasized that the Eighth Amendment “forbids only 
extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”147 
Thus, the Eighth Amendment is based on blameworthiness, and a person 
who is factually innocent is not blameworthy in relation to the crime 
                                                     
140. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
141. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“[W]hile the underlying social values 
encompassed by the Eighth Amendment are rooted in historical traditions, the manner in which our 
judicial system protects those values is purely a matter of contemporary law. Once a substantive 
right or restriction is recognized in the Constitution, therefore, its enforcement is in no way confined 
to the rudimentary process deemed adequate in ages past.”).  
142. Id. at 406; see also Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378–79 (1910). 
143. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
144. Id. at 667. 
145. 560 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
146. Id. at 2034. 
147. Id. at 2021 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 975, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). Lamenting the concept of non-capital 
proportionality review, Justice Thomas’s dissent (joined by Justice Scalia) emphasized “how long 
[the Court] ha[d] resisted crossing that [death is different] divide.” Id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
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charged. Indeed, imprisoning or executing a factually innocent person 
embodies the concept of grossly disproportionate punishment. 
In one sense, the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not reach far 
enough. It is designed to establish a class of crimes that are not severe 
enough to receive a particular sentence (e.g., death penalty for the rape 
of a child148) or a class of offenders who are not culpable enough to 
receive a particular sentence (e.g., juveniles and the death penalty149). In 
both scenarios, the Eighth Amendment question is an ex ante one about 
who could be subjected to what punishment and for which crimes. The 
idea that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishing the innocent despite 
their conviction is not based on the notion that innocent people cannot be 
executed, as that is clear. Rather, it would be based on the notion that the 
Constitution provides innocent prisoners with the right to prove that fact 
at some point after the conviction has become final. 
Under the Eighth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court requires a 
post-conviction determination of whether a right that the Amendment 
protects has been violated. In Ford v. Wainwright,150 the Court held that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit a state from executing a 
capital defendant who is insane at the time of the scheduled execution.151 
The Court explained that though a prisoner is not entitled to the same 
presumptions as before he was convicted, “he has not lost the protection 
of the Constitution altogether.”152 Indeed, “if the Constitution renders the 
fact or timing of his execution contingent upon establishment of a 
further fact, then that fact must be determined with the high regard for 
truth that befits a decision affecting the life or death of a human 
being.”153 The “contingent fact” to be determined prior to an execution is 
that the prisoner is sane, and that determination needs to be made at 
multiple points (e.g., pretrial, during trial, and before any execution) 
because sanity fluctuates. Innocence does not fluctuate, but, like sanity, 
the best facts to determine criminal liability might not be available at the 
trial, through no fault of the prisoner.154 For instance, in Todd 
Willingham’s case,155 it could not have been discovered at trial that the 
                                                     
148. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  
149. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
150. 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
151. Id. at 417 (Marshall, J., plurality opinion). 
152. Id. at 411.  
153. Id. 
154. The easiest example is that testing for small amounts (or degraded samples) of biological 
material might be impossible today, but tomorrow, due to scientific advances, that same biological 
material might prove exculpatory. 
155. See supra notes 118–125 and accompanying text.  
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fire scientists relied on faulty science in testifying that the fire that killed 
Willingham’s three children was arson.156 
Another possibility is to conceptualize each day of imprisonment—or 
the act of execution in capital cases—as a future event. This would 
reframe the incarceration of an innocent person as a perpetual violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. The shift in circumstances brought about by 
our contemporary understanding of the possibility of wrongful 
convictions and our enhanced ability to determine innocence posttrial 
might drive a corresponding change in what type of process is due to a 
prisoner who is able to demonstrate that he is factually innocent. 
Developments in state practice substantiate this notion. The vast 
majority of jurisdictions—most by statute, a handful through judicial 
interpretation of their respective state constitutions—afford a person 
with substantial evidence that he did not commit the crime with the 
opportunity to prove his innocence long after the conviction has become 
final.157 
                                                     
156. Willingham v. State, 897 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Perhaps the evidence of 
innocence does not even need to be “new” in the sense that it could not have been discovered at 
trial. In Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), the Court held that Texas was obligated to 
provide a full and fair opportunity for Panetti to prove that he is insane (and thus that he cannot be 
executed). Id. at 950. Dissenting, Justice Scalia complained about “the Court bend[ing] over 
backwards to allow Panetti to bring his Ford claim despite no evidence that his condition has 
worsened—or even changed—since 1995.” Id. at 963 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One could read Panetti 
to prohibit a person with the status of insanity from being executed, regardless of whether the claim 
could have been litigated on substantially similar facts at an earlier proceeding. If this is the case, 
then the impact on innocence claims (and also mental retardation type claims of death ineligibility) 
is apparent.  
157. Medwed, supra note 12, at 675 (“Each state currently permits a motion for a new trial on the 
basis of newly discovered evidence, nominally providing any state prisoner who may be factually 
innocent—and who has new evidence to substantiate that claim—with recourse to a post-trial 
procedure in state court”); see also In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 n.28 
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) (noting that only “three states . . . [that] have not enacted modern reforms 
to ensure that convicts are actually innocent are Massachusetts, Alaska, and Oklahoma”). The Davis 
opinion lists the following states as possessing provisions that also allow for post-conviction fact-
finding to facilitate actual innocence determinations: ALA. CODE § 15-18-200 (2009); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-4240 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405 
(West 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-413 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102kk (2003); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504 (West 2000); D.C. CODE § 22-4133 (2001); FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2006); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-123 (2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
4902 (2010); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-3 (2003); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-5 (2003); IOWA CODE 
§ 81.10 (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2511 (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (West 2002); 
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1 (2001); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2137 (2001); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16 (2000); MINN. STAT. 
§ 590.01 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-39-5 (1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 547.035 (West 2002); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-110 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 176.0918 (2003); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651-D:2 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West 
2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1A-2 (2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(1-a) (McKinney 
1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-32.1-15 (2005); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2953.72 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.690 (2001); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 9543.1 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-12 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-28-30 (2008); S.D. 
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These post-conviction relief mechanisms concede that the state’s 
interest in reliability exceeds its interest in finality. Thus, the argument 
from the evolution of contemporary practice, read in light of the primacy 
of innocence protection as a constitutional value, makes the case that the 
Eighth Amendment requires an opportunity for a prisoner to obtain post-
conviction relief upon a sufficient showing that he is factually 
innocent.158 
II.  POST-CONVICTION INNOCENCE CLAIMS SHOULD BE 
VIEWED THROUGH THE INNOCENCE-PROTECTION 
FRAMEWORK 
At this point, this Article has explored an innocent person’s right to 
be free from punishment. It also has considered that the trial is not the 
only or even the best time to determine factual innocence and has 
suggested that a prisoner who can marshal a strong post-conviction 
claim of factual innocence has a constitutional right to press that claim 
                                                     
CODIFIED LAWS § 23-5B-1 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-304 (2001); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 64.01 (West 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-301 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 5561 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2000); W. 
VA. CODE § 15-2B-14 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 974.07 (2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-12-303 (2008). 
In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 n.29. Most of these statutes place limits on the types of 
evidence that suffice (some limit to DNA only, some permit other forms of biological evidence, 
others permit all credible forms of new evidence) and most also place time or other restrictions on 
when claims can be raised. Medwed, supra note 12, at 676 (noting that “many time limits governing 
motions for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence are remarkably brief” and that 
only “[a] sparse number of jurisdictions—nine—have no limitations period whatsoever”). One 
important purpose of announcing a clear constitutional rule is to provide a uniform standard and to 
remove impediments that arbitrarily restrict the ability of prisoners to demonstrate actual innocence 
(e.g., DNA-only statutes, statutes that bar successive claims even though new evidence is found). 
158. The Fourteenth Amendment also provides protection from substantive due process 
violations. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) 
“substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the 
conscience,’ or interferes with rights ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Id. at 746 (quoting 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937)). In light of the primacy of innocence protection 
as a constitutional value, it also can be argued that imprisoning or executing a person known to be 
innocent would “shock the conscience” and “interfere with rights implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Janet C. Hoeffel, The 
Roberts Court’s Failed Innocence Project, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 43, 58–59 (2010) (asserting that 
the right to be free from punishment if innocent is protected by substantive due process and 
emphasizing that “[f]ar more politically controversial than a right to prove actual innocence, the 
findings of due process rights to abortion, contraceptives, or interracial marriage all led to questions 
for the states of what limits they could place on the right”). Similar to the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause absorbs meaning from 
contemporary practice. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952) (“The fact that a practice is 
followed by a large number of states is not conclusive in a decision as to whether that practice 
accords with due process, but it is plainly worth considering in determining whether the practice 
‘offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental.’” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
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and obtain relief if warranted. This part of the Article considers the 
mechanics of post-conviction relief based on innocence. The first section 
provides an overview of how the U.S. Supreme Court has treated post-
conviction innocence claims. The final section addresses the contours of 
the right to relief if innocent by proposing a three-tiered approach to 
adjudicating factual innocence claims. The first two tiers pertain to 
freestanding innocence claims. The third tier is a proposed reform to 
gateway innocence claims. 
A.  Overview of Post-Conviction Innocence Cases and the U.S. 
Supreme Court 
This section briefly describes the Court’s existing innocence 
jurisprudence, which encompasses both gateway and freestanding 
innocence claims. Gateway innocence claims are those in which the 
prisoner asserts that his factual innocence of the crime should excuse an 
otherwise defaulted claim of constitutional error in the trial process. In 
contrast, a petitioner who presents a freestanding innocence claim is 
asserting that new evidence suggests that he is factually innocent despite 
a constitutionally sound trial.159 
1.  Gateway Innocence 
A state prisoner can challenge the lawfulness of his detention in 
federal court through a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Article III, 
Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides the Court with 
“appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and 
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.”160 The Judiciary Act 
of 1789, which was the first Act by the First Congress, provided the 
Court with the ability to entertain petitions for a writ of habeas corpus 
from federal prisoners.161 Congress first authorized the Court to 
adjudicate habeas petitions from state court prisoners in 1867, 
                                                     
159. The majority of this section focuses on freestanding innocence claims, but my three-tiered 
proposal for adjudicating innocence claims suggests alterations to the framework for considering 
gateway innocence claims. 
160. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
161. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81, 81–82; see also Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 
651, 659 (1996) (noting that section 14 “authorized all federal courts, including this Court, to grant 
the writ of habeas corpus when prisoners were ‘in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the 
United States, or [were] committed for trial before some court of the same’” (alteration in original)). 
Habeas practice in the late 1700s consisted largely of freeing wrongfully detained pretrial prisoners. 
Id. Given the inability at the time to subject prisoners to long-term imprisonment, the nature of the 
practice makes sense. 
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contemporaneous with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.162 
Federal courts did not regularly review the merits of federal claims 
raised by state court prisoners until the mid-twentieth century.163 
Incorporation of the criminal-procedure-related provisions of the Bill of 
Rights in the 1960s drove up the number of habeas petitions filed in 
federal courts for relief from state court convictions.164 
To deal with the additional burden placed upon the federal courts, the 
Court crafted a host of procedural default rules aimed at reducing the 
quantity of claims for courts to adjudicate.165 Accordingly, a state 
prisoner ordinarily cannot obtain federal court review of a procedurally 
defaulted claim of constitutional error unless he can demonstrate both 
cause and prejudice.166 In Murray v. Carrier,167 the Court crafted an 
exception to the cause and prejudice rule in extraordinary cases where a 
constitutional error “probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 
actually innocent.”168 In Kuhlmann v. Wilson,169 decided on the same day 
as Murray, the Court elaborated that where “the prisoner supplements 
his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence,” 
the “ends of justice” require an exception to the default rule.170 
The idea that innocence suspends the procedural rules that ordinarily 
prevent a federal court from reviewing an alleged constitutional defect at 
trial is referred to as “procedural innocence.” In Schlup v. Delo,171 the 
Court explained that unlike a person who is arguing that his factual 
                                                     
162. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 475 
(1976) (“Under the 1867 Act federal courts were authorized to give relief in ‘all cases where any 
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law 
of the United States . . . .’”). 
163. Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1703, 1709–10 (2000).  
164. Id. (“As the Court extended the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments to state criminal defendants via the Fourteenth Amendment, the grounds for federal 
habeas petitions radically broadened; the sheer volume of petitions increased from less than 600 in 
1951 to over 12,000 in 1990.”). 
165. Id. at 1710. 
166. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542 (1976) (holding that “[i]n a collateral attack 
upon a conviction that rule requires, contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, not only a showing of 
‘cause’ for the defendant’s failure to challenge the composition of the grand jury before trial, but 
also a showing of actual prejudice”); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90–91 (1977).  
167. 477 U.S. 478 (1986). 
168. Id. at 496 (“[W]e think that in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has 
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant 
the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.”). 
169. 477 U.S. 436 (1986). 
170. Id. at 454 (“In the light of the historic purpose of habeas corpus and the interests implicated 
by successive petitions for federal habeas relief from a state conviction, we conclude that the ‘ends 
of justice’ require federal courts to entertain such petitions only where the prisoner supplements his 
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence.”).  
171. 513 U.S. 298 (1994). 
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innocence should trigger relief, those who bring procedural innocence 
claims seek to have a federal court grant relief on an underlying claim, 
such as ineffective assistance of counsel (Strickland v. Washington172) or 
the failure of the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence to the 
defense (Brady v. Maryland173).174 The Court emphasized the weighty 
reasons that counsel respect for state court procedural default rules and 
reiterated that, except for in extraordinary circumstances, a petitioner 
would need to show both cause and prejudice to proceed to the merits on 
defaulted claims.175 Nonetheless, after “balanc[ing] the societal interests 
in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the 
individual interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case,”176 the 
Court found that in such cases, “the principles of comity and finality that 
inform the concepts of cause and prejudice must yield to the imperative 
of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration.”177 The Court held 
that a petitioner is entitled to relief from default if it is “more likely than 
not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the 
new evidence” that he is innocent.178 
2.  Freestanding Innocence Claims 
Freestanding innocence claims are those in which the petitioner 
asserts that he is innocent despite a constitutionally sound trial. Though 
the Court has articulated a standard to review gateway innocence 
claims,179 it has not explicitly ruled that freestanding innocence claims 
are grounded in the Constitution. This is not to say that a freestanding 
innocence claim would be written on a blank slate, however.180 In 
                                                     
172. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
173. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
174. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (“Schlup’s claim of innocence is thus ‘not itself a constitutional 
claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise 
barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.’” (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 
404 (1993)). 
175. Id. at 314.  
176. Id. at 334. 
177. Id. at 320. 
178. Id. at 327.  
179. See supra text accompanying note 178. 
180. The Court also has addressed how to treat claims that a petitioner is innocent of the death 
penalty, meaning that he is not disputing that he committed the underlying crime, but is disputing 
that he was eligible for a possible death sentence. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992) 
(holding that to demonstrate actual innocence of the death penalty “one must show by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the 
petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law”). This Article focuses solely 
on how to treat crime-innocence claims. 
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Herrera v. Collins,181 the petitioner argued that regardless of whether he 
received a constitutionally sound trial, the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who is factually 
innocent of the underlying crime.182 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 
writing for the majority, noted that the claim had an “elemental 
appeal”183 but emphasized that “actual innocence based on newly 
discovered evidence ha[s] never been held to state a ground for federal 
habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in 
the underlying state criminal proceeding.”184 
The Herrera majority wrote that habeas corpus does not encompass a 
fact-finding mission, which is what an evaluation of factual innocence 
requires, but provides relief for inmates whose imprisonment offends the 
Constitution because of a legal error at trial.185 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
also expressed confusion over how a freestanding innocence claim 
would operate in practice: “Would [the relief] be commutation of 
petitioner’s death sentence, [a] new trial, or unconditional release from 
imprisonment?”186 Rehnquist also worried that “entertaining claims of 
actual innocence” would be “very disruptive” to the notion of finality, 
and that “having to retry cases based on often stale evidence” would 
impose an “enormous burden” on the states.187 Nonetheless, the Court 
assumed for the sake of argument that “in a capital case a truly 
persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would 
render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant federal 
habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a 
claim.”188 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by 
Justice Kennedy, wrote that she “cannot disagree with the fundamental 
legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the 
Constitution,” and that “the execution of a legally and factually innocent 
person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.”189 She, like the 
                                                     
181. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
182. Id. at 396–97. 
183. Id. at 398. 
184. Id. at 400 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (holding that “the existence 
merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for 
relief on federal habeas corpus”)). 
185. Id. (“[F]ederal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of 
the Constitution—not to correct errors of fact.”).  
186. Id. at 403. 
187. Id. at 417. 
188. Id.  
189. Id. at 419 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Court, however, determined that Herrera was not innocent. Justice Byron 
White wrote a separate concurring opinion, in which he voiced 
agreement that actual innocence claims could be raised “even though 
made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the 
presentation of newly discovered evidence.”190 White believed that at a 
minimum such claims would require the petitioner to demonstrate that 
after assessing “the newly discovered evidence and the entire record 
before the jury that convicted him, ‘no rational trier of fact could find 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”191 
Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by Justices David Souter and John 
Paul Stevens, dissented. The dissent argued that the Court should have 
squarely resolved whether the Constitution permits the execution of a 
factually innocent person: “Nothing could be more contrary to 
contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience, 
than to execute a person who is actually innocent.”192 The dissenters 
relied on the evolving standards of human decency reflected in the 
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. They 
reasoned that if punishing rape and mere involvement in a homicide with 
the death penalty is “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime” then it “plainly is violative of the Eighth Amendment to execute 
a person who is actually innocent.”193 In a footnote, the dissent also 
noted that it might be unconstitutional to incarcerate a person who is 
factually innocent.194 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, penned a vicious 
concurrence, arguing that “[t]here is no basis in text, tradition, or even in 
contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in the 
Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly 
discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.”195 
Responding to Justice Blackmun’s claim that executing the factually 
innocent “shocks the conscience,” Justice Scalia scolded “[i]f the system 
that has been in place for 200 years (and remains widely approved) 
‘shock[s]’ the dissenters’ consciences, perhaps they should doubt the 
calibration of their consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of 
‘conscience shocking’ as a legal test.”196 
                                                     
190. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring). 
191. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979)). 
192. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 431. 
194. Id. at 432 n.2.  
195. Id. at 427–28 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
196. Id. at 428. 
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Twelve years later, in House v. Bell,197 the Court again granted 
certiorari to resolve whether a freestanding innocence claim is 
cognizable and again did not resolve the question.198 The prosecution in 
House had secured a guilty verdict and death sentence against Paul 
House for the murder of one of his neighbors.199 At trial, the prosecution 
presented evidence that the victim’s blood was present on the pants that 
House wore on the night of the crime200 and that semen found on the 
victim belonged to House.201 House brought his underlying 
constitutional claims based on newly discovered evidence to federal 
court after the Tennessee state courts found them to be procedurally 
defaulted.202 House presented evidence proving that semen on the 
victim’s pants belonged to the victim’s husband.203 He also brought 
forward evidence that small drops of blood belonging to the victim had 
transferred to House’s pants as a result of a spill from an autopsy sample 
and not from direct transfer from the victim.204 Taken together, those 
two facts undercut the probative force of the State’s case at trial. The 
Court held that the new evidence that House presented met the 
procedural innocence threshold (i.e., the gateway innocence standard), 
but did not meet whatever threshold showing would be required to prove 
a substantive innocence claim.205 Once again, the Court reserved the 
freestanding innocence question, noting that Herrera described the 
(would-be) standard as “extraordinarily high,” and thus “implie[d] at the 
least that Herrera requires more convincing proof of innocence than 
Schlup.”206 
In In re Troy Anthony Davis,207 the U.S. Supreme Court exercised its 
original habeas jurisdiction for the first time in nearly fifty years to 
transfer Davis’s petition to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Georgia.208 In 1991, a Chatham County, Georgia, jury 
sentenced Davis to death for the murder of a Savannah police officer.209 
                                                     
197. 547 U.S. 518 (2006). 
198. Id. at 554–55. 
199. Id. at 525–34. 
200. Id. at 541. 
201. Id. at 529.  
202. Id. at 534. 
203. Id. at 540. 
204. Id. at 542. 
205. Id. at 555. 
206. Id. 
207. 557 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1 (2009) (mem.). 
208. Id. at 1. 
209. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). 
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The case against Davis rested on the testimony of nine eyewitnesses. 
Seven of the nine subsequently recanted their identification of Davis as 
the shooter.210 One of the two remaining witnesses was the alternative 
suspect.211 Multiple individuals alleged that another man, Sylvester 
“Red” Coles, confessed to the crime.212 No physical evidence connected 
Davis to the crime, nor does any known physical evidence exist to 
exonerate him.213 
The Court ordered the district court to “receive testimony and make 
findings of fact as to whether evidence that could not have been obtained 
at the time of trial clearly establishes petitioner’s innocence.”214 Justice 
Scalia dissented from the transfer order, accusing the Court of sending 
the district court on a “fool’s errand.”215 He wrote: 
If this Court thinks it possible that capital convictions obtained 
in full compliance with law can never be final, but are always 
subject to being set aside by federal courts for the reason of 
‘actual innocence,’ it should set this case on our own docket so 
that we can (if necessary) resolve that question.216 
Justice Stevens shot back at Justice Scalia, writing that a “substantial 
risk of putting an innocent man to death clearly provides an adequate 
justification for holding an evidentiary hearing.”217 Justice Stevens 
faulted Justice Scalia’s logic that innocence provides a gateway to 
consideration of defaulted substantive claims, but is itself not an 
independent claim warranting relief.218 He argued that it would allow for 
executing a person who “possesses new evidence conclusively and 
definitively proving, beyond any scintilla of doubt, that he is an innocent 
man.”219 “The Court,” Justice Stevens concluded, “correctly refuses to 
endorse such reasoning.”220 The federal district court held an evidentiary 
hearing, but ruled that the evidence did not adequately support Davis’s 
innocence claim.221 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently refused to 
                                                     
210. Id. at *54. 
211. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
212. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *55. 
213. Id. at *59–61. 
214. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (mem.). 
215. Id. at 4 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
216. Id.  
217. Id. at 1 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
218. See id. at 1–2. 
219. Id. at 2. 
220. Id. 
221. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *61 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010). 
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review the district court’s judgment.222 If credible, the post-conviction 
evidence that Davis presented casts serious doubt on the accuracy of the 
trial verdict, though it does not eliminate all doubt that Davis committed 
the crime. 
The federal district court judge who presided over the transfer order 
ruled that the Constitution does prohibit the execution of a person who is 
factually innocent, but found that Davis did not adequately prove his 
innocence.223 The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently denied Davis’s 
renewed requests for review,224 leaving the existence of a freestanding 
innocence claim unresolved. The remainder of this Article articulates a 
three-tiered proposal for adjudicating these types of claims. 
B.  The Three-Tiered Proposal 
The following three-tiered proposal involves differing standards of 
proof. A standard of proof in a post-conviction criminal case distributes 
risk between the plausibly innocent prisoner and the society that retains 
an interest in maintaining accurate convictions. It also signals the degree 
of confidence that society should have in the outcome of a proceeding.225 
Prisoners who bring post-conviction innocence claims should be sorted 
into three groups depending on the relief requested: 
 
1. Conviction Relief. A prisoner who seeks outright reversal of his 
conviction based solely on the grounds that he did not commit the 
crime in question must present a judge with clear and convincing 
evidence that he is factually innocent. Clear and convincing evidence 
is evidence that convinces the judge that the prisoner is “highly 
probably” innocent.226 
                                                     
222. Davis v. Humphrey, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1788 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011) (No. 10-950). 
223. In re Davis, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1.  
224. Davis, 131 S. Ct. 1788 (dismissing appeal from Georgia District Court, denying petition for 
writ of habeas corpus, and denying a common law writ of certiorari); Davis v. Humphrey, 563 
U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1787 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011) (No. 10-949) (denying petition for writ of certiorari to 
Eleventh Circuit); In re Davis, 563 U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 1808 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011) (No. 08-1443) 
(denying petition for writ of habeas corpus). Georgia executed Troy Davis on September 21, 2011. 
Kim Severson, Davis Is Executed in Georgia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/us/final-pleas-and-vigils-in-troy-davis-execution.html. 
225. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (citing In re Winship, 397 U. S. 
358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
226. See Bryant M. Bennett, Evidence: Clear and Convincing Proof: Appellate Review, 32 
CALIF. L. REV. 74, 75 (1944); J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 
242, 254 (1944) (asserting that under a clear and convincing evidence standard the “litigant who 
bears the burden must induce belief in the minds of the judge or the jury that the facts which he 
asserts are not merely probably true, but that they are highly probably true, yet not require him to 
discharge the greater burden of persuading them that they are almost certainly true, true beyond a 
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2. Execution Relief. A death-sentenced prisoner who cannot convince 
a judge that he is “highly probably innocent,” nonetheless should be 
spared from execution if he can convince the judge that it is more 
likely than not that he did not commit the crime. 
 
3. Gateway Innocence. A prisoner who is unable to prove that he is 
highly probably innocent, or even that it is more likely than not that 
he is innocent, should still be able to obtain review on the merits of a 
defaulted substantive constitutional claim (e.g., Brady) if the prisoner 
is able to convince a judge that there is a reasonable probability that 
he is factually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. 
 
This three-tiered approach balances the necessity of avoiding 
wrongful imprisonment or execution with the legitimate concern that a 
person who is wrongfully released could not be convicted in a new trial 
due to fluctuations in the availability of witnesses, memory, and 
evidence quality that accompany the passage of time.227 It provides a 
uniform rule for treatment of possibly innocent prisoners as they litigate 
such claims in both state and federal courts. Indeed, one benefit of 
establishing the contours of the constitutional right is to encourage 
adequate resolution of state prisoner claims before they get to federal 
court. 
The proposal also prevents doctrinal stretching by providing an outlet 
for freestanding claims without requiring courts to stretch the merits of 
underlying claims of constitutional error. Judges generally do not want 
to be responsible for the conviction or execution of an innocent person. 
Nonetheless, as of yet, there is no freestanding innocence remedy.228 In 
close cases where the person appears to be innocent, judges might be 
tempted to “find” Brady, Strickland, or Batson229 errors that might not 
otherwise be winning claims. The problem in those cases is that the 
individual person gains relief, but the clarity of the procedural doctrine 
suffers, along with its general deterrent and enforcement mechanisms. 
Consequently, lawyers, judges, and law enforcement officials struggle to 
                                                     
reasonable doubt, or are certainly true”). 
227. Indeed, the uncertainty over the relief that would follow from a freestanding innocence 
claim, specifically the fear of releasing a guilty murderer who could not be reconvicted, might be 
responsible for Congress’s reluctance to remove the procedural obstacles that surround the 
substance of any would-be freestanding innocence claim.  
228. See supra Part II.A.2. 
229. See infra note 307 (discussing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
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apply the facts to future cases.230 Thus, due to the flaws inherent in 
stretching underlying claims to grant relief, a freestanding innocence 
claim provides a more legitimate alternative for vacating a conviction.231 
The analysis that follows challenges a fundamental assumption of the 
existing innocence jurisprudence. Remember that in a gateway 
innocence claim, a convincing case of innocence provides an entryway 
through which a federal court can consider an otherwise defaulted claim 
that the prisoner received a constitutionally deficient trial.232 The Court 
in Schlup posited that a conviction that underlies a successful gateway 
innocence claim is entitled to less respect than a conviction challenged 
via a freestanding innocence claim because the latter type of conviction 
arose from an error-free trial.233 This theory relies on the assumption that 
an under-functioning innocence protection mechanism (e.g., the right to 
effective assistance of counsel) is more likely to result in the conviction 
of an innocent person than the under-consideration of post-conviction 
evidence (e.g., DNA evidence) undermining the accuracy of the trial 
verdict. That assumption is erroneous. As articulated at length earlier in 
this Article, there is reason to believe that in some cases exonerating 
evidence discovered post-conviction is more likely to indicate a 
wrongful conviction than the discovery of a trial error.234 Moreover, the 
focus on trial error is tied to the now-suspect assumption that an error-
free trial process protects the innocent (and thus a trial error interferes 
with reliable guilt determinations) and not to any notion that there is 
independent value in getting the established process correct even if the 
result is flawed. Trial error might be correlated with wrongful 
convictions, but an error-free trial is not sufficient to prevent them. 
A person who brings a freestanding innocence claim, and who 
                                                     
230. One could argue that “harmless error” findings already obscure doctrinal clarity. The 
difference between doctrinal stretching and a finding of harmless error is that in the harmless error 
context the constitutional violation is analyzed separately from merits of the underlying 
constitutional violation, which preserves the integrity of the doctrine.  
231. A federal constitutional rule provides cover for state court judges and legislators whose 
incentives are not clearly aligned with the release of a potentially—but not certainly—innocent 
prisoner. See generally Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: 
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759 
(1995).  
232. See supra Part II.A.1. 
233. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995) (“Schlup, in contrast [to Herrera], 
accompanies his claim of innocence with an assertion of constitutional error at trial. For that reason, 
Schlup’s conviction may not be entitled to the same degree of respect as one, such as Herrera’s, that 
is the product of an error-free trial.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 57, at 61–62 (“[T]he courts 
consistently have adopted more favorable standards of review for non-guilt-related claims than for 
those claims most likely to be tied to guilt and innocence.” (emphasis in original)). 
234. See supra Part I.B. 
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presents the necessary quantum of proof to obtain relief, brings a 
stronger claim—entitling the conviction to less respect.235 The right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, or the right to confrontation, are 
means to the end of protecting the innocent. Post-conviction evidence—
especially biological evidence—can be more probative of guilt than any 
evidence introduced at trial. As a result, excluding it from a fact-finder’s 
consideration will often be far more damaging to the truth-seeking 
process than the under-functioning of a constitutionally protected 
procedural right at trial. A reliable innocence determination, whenever it 
is best determined based on the facts as we know them and as soon as 
we can know them, is the standard to which we want to attach post-
conviction review. 
Before defining the contours of the three-tiered framework, it is 
important to acknowledge that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA)236 presents complications for adjudicating post-
conviction innocence claims filed by state court prisoners in federal 
court. In his dissent from the transfer order in In re Davis, Justice Scalia 
asserted that the federal district court could not grant relief to Davis 
because AEDPA precludes federal courts from granting habeas relief 
unless the state court judgment is contrary to or an objectively 
unreasonable interpretation of federal law as clearly established by U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent.237 Similarly, a federal court cannot grant 
habeas relief on a factual disagreement with the state court unless the 
state court’s interpretation of the facts is objectively unreasonable.238 
                                                     
235. Professor Stuntz makes a similar point:  
In the criminal process, the presence of plausible constitutional claims is a poor proxy for 
plausible claims on the merits. Discriminatory jury selection may lead to biased juries, which 
then do a bad job of deciding whether the defendant is guilty. Yet there is no good reason to 
treat any particular instance of discriminatory jury selection as a signal that this jury erred in 
finding this defendant guilty; a much better way to identify likely errors would be to look at the 
evidence in particular cases. A great many criminal procedure claims are like that: They 
correlate (if at all) only very slightly with strong claims on the merits. 
Stuntz, supra note 57, at 46–47 (emphasis in original). 
236. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).  
237. In re Davis, 557 U.S.__, 130 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d) (2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim — (1) 
resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”). 
238. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that 
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . (2) 
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2002) 
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Troy Davis sought to circumvent the AEDPA restrictions by filing a 
petition directly to the Court, urging it to hear the case under its original 
habeas jurisdiction.239 Distinct from the Court’s Article III jurisdiction, 
the Court’s original habeas jurisdiction derives from Article I of the 
Constitution, which provides: “The privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”240 Congress provided 
statutory authorization for the Court’s original habeas jurisdiction in 
section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (and later in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241).241 The writ is rarely granted, and under U.S. Supreme Court 
Rule 20.4, a petitioner “must show that exceptional circumstances 
warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary powers, and that 
adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other form or from any other 
court.”242 The Court has not granted habeas relief under its original 
jurisdiction since 1925.243 Indeed, In re Davis marked the first time in 
nearly fifty years that the Court used its power under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(b) to transfer an original habeas action to a federal district 
court.244 
The relationship between AEDPA and original habeas jurisdiction is 
contentious and beyond the scope of this Article. However, both the 
Court and Congress have feasible options to allow the two to coexist. 
First, the Court could hold that Congress did not intend the operative 
portions of AEDPA to limit its original habeas jurisdiction, as opposed 
to its appellate jurisdiction. In Felker v. Turpin,245 the Court held that 
Congress did not intend to repeal its original habeas jurisdiction in 
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E), which bars the Court from 
reviewing the decision of a federal appellate court denying a petitioner 
                                                     
(“The federal habeas scheme . . . authorizes federal-court intervention only when a state-court 
decision is objectively unreasonable.”). 
239. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 2 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the petition was brought 
under the Court’s original jurisdiction).  
240. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
241. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 659 & n.1 (1996) (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 
1 Stat. 82). 
242. SUP. CT. R. 20.4 (2010). 
243. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 107–08, 122 (1925) (ordering the discharge of a 
prisoner who received a full pardon from the President); Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 
VA. L. REV. 61, 62 (2011) (noting that original habeas relief has not been granted since 1925). 
244. See In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(b) (2006) 
(“The Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any circuit judge may decline to entertain an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and 
determination to the district court having jurisdiction to entertain it.”). 
245. 518 U.S. 651. 
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leave to file a second or successive petition.246 The Court emphasized 
that if Congress intends for a new rule to impact its original habeas 
jurisdiction, as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction, Congress must say 
so explicitly.247 That rule is relevant in this context. 
Congress also could revise AEDPA. Enacting legislation viewed as 
pro-defendant is not an easy political sell. However, there is reason to 
believe that innocence-based reforms are different. Legislation reforms 
based on innocence have been passed in almost every state,248 and even 
traditionally conservative courts have expressed frustration over 
AEDPA’s inflexibility in the innocence context.249 Moreover, public 
polling on attitudes towards wrongful convictions reveals that citizens 
are aware of the problem and believe that it needs correction.250 Thus, 
amending AEDPA to allow for the proposal in this Article likely can be 
accomplished without substantial public backlash. Moreover, the 
proposal for an intermediate solution that results in reversing the death 
sentence—but not the conviction—of a prisoner who demonstrates 
probable innocence might further increase political capital for the 
proposal. This is so because the execution-relief proposal decreases the 
                                                     
246. Id. at 661. 
247. See id. (“[W]e declined to find a repeal of § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as applied to this 
Court by implication then, we decline to find a similar repeal of § 2241 of Title 28—its descendant, 
by implication now.” (internal citations omitted)). 
248. See sources cited supra note 157. 
249. The frustration expressed recently by the conservative Fifth Circuit could be telling: 
It is beyond regrettable that a possibly innocent man will not receive a new trial in the face of 
the preposterously unreliable testimony of the victim and sole eyewitness to the crime for 
which he was convicted. But, our hands are tied by the AEDPA, preventing our review of 
Kinsel’s attack on his Louisiana post-conviction proceedings, so we dutifully dismiss his 
claim. 
 Kinsel v. Cain, 647 F.3d 265, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2011). 
250. See Regina A. Corso, Over Three in Five Americans Believe in Death Penalty: Half of 
Americans Say Death Penalty Not a Deterrent to Others, HARRIS INTERACTIVE (Mar. 18, 2008), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/vault/Harris-Interactive-Poll-Research-Over-Three-in-Five-
Americans-Believe-in-Death-Penalty-2008-03.pdf (reporting the results of a survey of 1010 
Americans, which found that “[t]here is one issue almost all Americans agree on – 95 percent of 
U.S. adults say that sometimes innocent people are convicted of murder while only 5 percent 
believe that this never occurs. This is a number that has held steady since 1999. Among those who 
believe innocent people are sometimes convicted of murder, when asked how many they believe are 
innocent, the average is 12 out of 100 or 12 percent”); June 2000 Newsweek Poll Data, 
POLLINGREPORT.COM, http://www.pollingreport.com/crime.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) 
(reporting that 82% of 750 survey participants nationally agreed that “[i]n general . . . states should 
make it easier for Death Row inmates to introduce new evidence that might prove their innocence, 
even if that might result in delays in the death penalty process”). These polling results likely stem 
from the fact that awareness of wrongful convictions has seeped into many facets of public 
consciousness. See Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2008) (“[T]he 
innocence movement has captivated the public with accounts of the exonerated not only surfacing 
regularly in newspapers, film documentaries, and television news programs, but also making 
inroads into components of pop culture.”).  
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risk that a guilty person is released while maximizing the odds that an 
innocent person is not executed. 
The following discussion assumes that there has not been a previous 
decision on the merits on the same claim and on the same facts as 
presented to the federal court. This might be true for a variety of reasons: 
perhaps the state court refused to allow the petitioner to present evidence 
because the court rules that the evidence could have been discovered 
earlier,251 or the time to raise an extraordinary motion for a new trial 
under state law has elapsed, or this is a state post-conviction proceeding 
where the court is determining the petitioner’s rights under the Eighth 
Amendment. This section articulates the standard of proof that the 
Constitution requires to upset a conviction based on a claim of 
freestanding evidence. 
1.  Conviction-Relief 
Imagine a scenario where a person is convicted and sentenced to 
death in state court after a trial free of constitutional error. The 
hypothetical person receives sterling representation on direct appeal, as 
well as on state and federal habeas. He obtains no relief from his 
conviction or death sentence. The state sets an execution date. After 
seeing the reported execution date on the news, a witness comes forward 
who happened to be in the convenience store at the time that the 
hypothetical prisoner is said to have shot the store attendant. Imagine 
that the new witness recorded the shooting on her cell phone. The video 
is a little fuzzy, but the shooter definitely appears to be taller and lighter-
skinned than the prisoner convicted of murdering the clerk.252 
The attorney for the hypothetical prisoner files immediately under the 
applicable state post-conviction procedure. The state court refuses to 
hear the new evidence. The governor will not commute the sentence. 
The federal courts are the only hope left. How should they treat the 
                                                     
251. This restriction itself might pose constitutional problems because an innocent person has 
every possible incentive to obtain exculpatory evidence as early as possible. Thus, refusing to admit 
undiscoverable evidence that could have been discovered before conviction, yet went undiscovered, 
might infringe upon due process. 
252. This case is perhaps too close to certitude to be an apt example for the clear and convincing 
evidence standard. I use it, however, to remove the factual scenario from the possibility that the 
proposed standard is not met. To make the scenario messier, which is often the case in wrongful 
conviction cases, suppose that the state retorts that a jury found the prosecution’s case to be credible 
and that the new evidence does not explain other incriminating evidence in the case, such as the fact 
that the prisoner in the hypothetical was in the store minutes before the shooting or that he was 
apprehended running down the street adjacent to the store. A reviewing court would need to weigh 
the new videotape evidence with the evidence presented at trial when deciding whether the 
petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence of his innocence. 
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claim? Although the federal court cannot be certain that the defendant is 
not the shooter, this type of showing would satisfy the “truly persuasive” 
evidence benchmark discussed in Herrera. The videotape, while grainy, 
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the prisoner is 
factually innocent, and upon such a showing the Constitution should 
require reversing the conviction.253 Before turning to why the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is the most appropriate to use in this 
context, it is important to discuss why other standards of proof are less 
desirable. 
The distinction between standards seems less important than 
establishing the existence of the right to challenge the conviction on 
innocence grounds. That perception changes quickly amidst the 
difficulties that come with any standard used to measure the combined 
quantum of evidence produced in at least two separate events—the trial 
and a post-conviction evidentiary hearing—that usually are spaced out 
over a period of many years. The implications of new, post-conviction 
evidence differ from those associated with more traditional claims of 
trial error. In the context of an insufficiency of the evidence claim, the 
court asks only whether the jurors were authorized to reach a guilty 
verdict, while a traditional constitutional trial error claim requires a 
showing of prejudice.254 In contrast, in the freestanding innocence 
context, the newly adduced evidence is considered without having been 
filtered through the range of trial mechanisms that render the process of 
deciding guilt or innocence more accurate, such as a jury trial or the live 
testimony of now-unavailable witnesses. 
Credibility evaluations are also more difficult than in the context of 
traditional trial error. For instance, after an evidentiary hearing, a habeas 
judge is in a better position to render credibility determinations on the 
newly discovered evidence, while the trial jurors are in a better position 
to test the credibility of the original evidence.255 Thus, any standard that 
requires a probabilistic determination of what a reasonable juror would 
have done given all of the evidence requires the habeas judge to filter the 
new evidence through the credibility assessment, factor in the evidence 
                                                     
253. This is likely the type of scenario (but not the relief) envisioned by the Court in Herrera 
when it assumed arguendo that “in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual 
innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional, and warrant 
federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.” Herrera v. Collins, 
506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993).  
254. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring petitioner to 
demonstrate prejudice before relief could be granted on ineffective assistance of counsel claim). 
255. This is not an uncontroversial point. Some commentators suggest that the review of 
transcripts results in more—not less—accurate verdicts in some instances. See, e.g., Mark 
Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 829–30 (2011). 
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presented at trial without the benefit of the credibility determinations 
rendered there, and balance the combined evidence to predict what a 
reasonable juror would have done. The task is daunting. As such, the 
standard that governs the claim must be flexible enough to be 
administrable under a range of factual scenarios that cover a host of 
different types of new evidence while being clear enough that it does not 
add to the difficulty of the determination. 
In his Herrera concurrence, Justice White suggested that the Court 
borrow the “insufficiency of the evidence” standard articulated in 
Jackson v. Virginia,256 which would require the petitioner to demonstrate 
that “no rational trier of fact could [find] proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”257 The Jackson standard is a corollary to the 
requirement that the prosecution prove every element of a crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt.258 It requires the appellate court to determine 
whether any reasonable juror could convict based on the evidence 
presented at trial.259 Shortly after the Court decided Herrera, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals (the highest court in Texas with jurisdiction 
over criminal cases) held that a habeas petitioner who presented a court 
with evidence that met the “no rational trier of fact” standard would state 
a cognizable freestanding innocence claim.260 The dissent accused the 
majority of crafting an unreachable standard: 
[T]he majority has given with one hand and taken away with the 
other. . . . This is an impossibly high standard of proof. By that I 
do not mean that as a practical matter precious few applicants 
will be able to produce new evidence sufficiently compelling to 
meet the majority’s test. By that I mean that it will be impossible 
by definition for any applicant to meet the test, regardless of how 
compelling his newly discovered evidence. 
This is so because any evidence sufficient to support a jury’s 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt at trial will also be sufficient 
to support a rational jury’s guilty verdict even after adding the 
most compelling newly discovered evidence to the mix.261 
                                                     
256. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). 
257. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 429 (White, J., concurring) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324). 
258. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. 
259. Id. 
260. State ex rel. Holmes v. Court of Appeals, 885 S.W.2d 389, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), 
rejected by Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that a 
prisoner is entitled to relief on a freestanding innocence claim if the habeas judge determines at a 
hearing that “the newly discovered evidence, when considered in light of the entire record before 
the jury that convicted him, shows that no rational trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). 
261. Id. at 417 (Clinton, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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An insufficiency of the evidence claim is directed at the quantum of 
evidence presented at trial. In the context of a freestanding innocence 
claim, the prisoner is not contesting that the prosecution put forth 
adequate evidence at the trial to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Rather, the claim is that new evidence arose after the fact, casting 
doubt on the accuracy of the original determination. Thus, the Jackson 
standard, with its focus on the minimum level of evidence necessary to 
sustain a conviction rather than a probabilistic determination of the 
likelihood that the prisoner is factually innocent, is too miserly if the 
goal is to remedy the wrongful punishment of a person who did not 
commit the underlying crime. 
Given that the “no rational trier of fact” standard is insufficient to 
remedy wrongful convictions, stricter standards certainly are not 
desirable. For instance, following Herrera, a California appellate court 
held that in order to obtain habeas relief new evidence of innocence must 
“cast[] fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the 
proceedings. . . . [It] must undermine the entire prosecution case and 
point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.”262 Any standard 
that requires near-certitude (such as DNA evidence excluding the 
prisoner and pointing to another culprit) does not reflect our 
contemporary knowledge of wrongful convictions or our understanding 
that trial procedures alone cannot protect the innocent sufficiently. 
In Herrera’s aftermath, the Illinois Supreme Court held that its state 
constitution affords a new trial to a petitioner who can demonstrate 
innocence by evidence “of such conclusive character that it will 
probably change the result on retrial.”263 The position that the federal 
                                                     
262. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 
1196 (Cal. 1990)); see also State v. Conway, 816 So. 2d 290, 291 (La. 2002) (suggesting that a 
freestanding innocence claim would require the prisoner to demonstrate that the new evidence 
“undermine[s] the prosecution’s entire case” (alteration in original) (citing In re Clark, 855 P.2d at 
739)). 
263. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1340 (Ill. 1996) (McMorrow, J., specially 
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
In order to be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence, 
the defendant must demonstrate that the new evidence is of such conclusive character that it 
will probably change the result on retrial, that the evidence was discovered since the trial and . 
. . [that it is of such] character that it could not have been discovered prior to trial by the 
exercise of due diligence. 
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jordan Steiker, Innocence and 
Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REV. 303, 387 (1993) (concluding that a “bare-innocence” claim 
should be cognizable on federal habeas review and arguing that “[t]o receive relief, a bare-
innocence claimant should bear the burden of demonstrating innocence by a preponderance of the 
evidence—that is, a petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that he did not commit the 
crime”). 
09 - WLR March 2012 Smith Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2012 11:17 AM 
186 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:139 
 
Constitution requires relief for a prisoner who is probably innocent, 
which was originally articulated in Justice Blackmun’s Herrera 
dissent,264 cuts too far the other way. Releasing a convicted prisoner 
under a probable innocence standard (which theoretically is met even at 
forty-nine percent likelihood that the prisoner is guilty) does not 
adequately account for the societal interest in securing and maintaining 
convictions against those who do commit crimes. The prosecution might 
not be able to successfully retry a prisoner. Witnesses move or die. 
Memories fade. A reversal on traditional trial error grounds similarly 
results in the diminished ability to retry the prisoner; however, in the 
context of a traditional trial error, society through its representatives—
the police and the prosecution—did something improper to subvert the 
constitutionality of the initial determination. By contrast, in the 
freestanding innocence context, the decreased odds of securing another 
conviction do not stem from government wrongdoing or from 
insufficient evidence to secure the initial conviction. 
The spectrum of uncertainty that marks the space between the rejected 
probable innocence (51%) and certain innocence (100%) standards is 
vast. The clear and convincing evidence standard is the appropriate 
compromise. To meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, an 
appellate court judge needs to find that the petitioner demonstrated with 
“convincing clarity” that he is factually innocent of the crime 
committed.265 Put another way, the appellate judge must believe that the 
prisoner is “highly probably innocent.”266 The Court has categorized the 
clear and convincing evidence standard as an intermediate standard of 
proof between the “preponderance of the evidence” and “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standards.267 Its roots are in civil proceedings, but it is 
used in a number of criminal law contexts, too. For example, in Sawyer 
v. Whitley,268 the Court held that a death-sentenced prisoner who 
                                                     
264. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 444 (1993) (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (“I believe that if a 
prisoner can show that he is probably actually innocent, in light of all the evidence, then he has 
made a truly persuasive demonstration, and his execution would violate the Constitution.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
265. See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (using 
“convincing clarity” to explain the clear and convincing evidence threshold required to prove 
“actual malice” in the First Amendment context). 
266. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
267. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). The Court suggested in Addington that 
attempts to further differentiate between clear and convincing evidence and other intermediate 
standards of proof might be fruitless. See id. (“We probably can assume no more than that the 
difference between a preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt probably 
is better understood than either of them in relation to the intermediate standard of clear and 
convincing evidence.”). 
268. 505 U.S. 333 (1992). 
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demonstrates his “innocence of the death penalty” (i.e., that he is death 
ineligible) by clear and convincing evidence is permitted to bypass any 
procedural defaults that obstruct review of his underlying constitutional 
claim.269 In the quasi-criminal civil commitment context, the Court held 
that due process requires that a state prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that a mentally ill person is an imminent danger to himself or 
to others before the government can involuntarily commit him.270 These 
two examples demonstrate that the Court imposes the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in situations that demand weighty 
consideration and only tolerate very low levels of risk.271 At the same 
time, unlike standards that require near-certitude, the clear and 
convincing evidence threshold is both relaxed enough to permit relief in 
extraordinary cases and flexible enough to encompass a wide range of 
fact patterns.272 
This is not to imply that the prisoner is entitled to reversal with 
prejudice—which is the case in the insufficiency of the evidence 
context.273 The state would retain the power to retry a prisoner granted 
factual innocence relief. In the insufficiency of the evidence context, the 
Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial because the state did not possess the 
necessary evidence to secure a conviction by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.274 When a prisoner secures relief under a “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard, however, the new evidence renders it highly 
improbable that a jury would return a guilty verdict. However, it does 
not preclude the possibility that a juror could find proof of guilt beyond 
                                                     
269. See id. at 336, 339. 
270. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 429–32 (holding that states must, at a minimum, refrain from 
involuntarily committing citizens except by proof by clear and convincing evidence that the 
mentally ill person is a danger to himself or others). 
271. See id. at 424 (indicating that the Court “has used the ‘clear, unequivocal and convincing’ 
standard of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases” 
(citations omitted)). “The standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on 
individual liberty.” Id. (citing Tippet v. Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971)); see also In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (“[A] standard of proof represents an attempt to instruct the 
fact-finder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness 
of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”). 
272. The clear and convincing evidence standard is the most popular in post-Herrera 
consideration of freestanding innocence claims. See In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 
3385081, at *45 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010); Montoya v. Ulibarri, 163 P.3d 476, 478 (N.M. 2007); 
People v. Cole, 765 N.Y.S.2d 477, 486 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 209 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 
273. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993) (asking whether a prisoner granted 
freestanding innocence relief would receive a “new trial, or unconditional release from 
imprisonment”). 
274. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 142 (1986) (holding that “a judgment that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause”). 
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a reasonable doubt.275 Moreover, in the factual innocence context, unlike 
the insufficiency context, the strongest evidence of innocence is not 
tested along with the strongest evidence of guilt in a process steeped 
with the full panoply of constitutionally defined innocence protection 
mechanisms. Finally, in the innocence context, two sets of actors—the 
jurors and a post-conviction judge—make the credibility determinations. 
Neither set is likely to hear live testimony from all the witnesses upon 
which the innocence determination is made. These factors all counsel 
towards permitting the state to retry any prisoner granted relief under a 
freestanding actual innocence claim. 
2.  Execution Relief 
Remaining with the hypothetical murder of the convenience store 
clerk, suppose that instead of presenting a video recording of the 
shooting from her cell phone camera, the new witness informs the police 
that she saw the murder occur, but then ran out of the store after the 
shots were fired. The police review the videotape from the store—which 
was not used at trial because it does not show the face of the 
perpetrator—and see that the new witness was at the scene moments 
before crime. The new witness is positive that the person who killed the 
clerk was much taller than our hypothetical prisoner. The perpetrator 
also had lighter skin, she remembers. She apologizes for not coming 
forward sooner. She has no relationship with the hypothetical prisoner, 
and is an avid supporter of the death penalty. Nonetheless, she insists 
that the wrong man is about to be executed. This scenario (likely even 
more so than the stronger claim of innocence presented by a video that 
displays the general outline of the assailant) demonstrates the tensions 
that accompany strong but inconclusive claims of actual innocence. 
Either the hypothetical prisoner murdered a convenience store clerk in 
cold blood or else the state is going to execute an innocent man. 
On the one hand, the prisoner received a fair trial. Who is to say that 
the new evidence is correct? Maybe the new witness remembers 
incorrectly. If the court vacates the death sentence, and the prisoner 
indeed is guilty, it might be impossible to reconvict him. The legal 
                                                     
275. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42–43 (1982) (“A reversal based on the weight of the 
evidence, moreover, can occur only after the State both has presented sufficient evidence to support 
conviction and has persuaded the jury to convict. The reversal simply affords the defendant a 
second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment.”). The Tibbs court stated, “Just as the Double 
Jeopardy Clause does not require society to pay the high price of freeing every defendant whose 
first trial was tainted by prosecutorial error, it should not exact the price of immunity for every 
defendant who persuades an appellate panel to overturn an error-free conviction and give him a 
second chance at acquittal.” Id. at 44. 
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system would have released a murderer onto the street with no recourse. 
On the other hand, is society willing to execute this man despite the very 
real possibility that he did not commit the crime? This is a case of 
probable innocence. It is not as strong of a case as one where new DNA 
results eliminate the prisoner as a suspect. It is not as weak as a claim 
where a single witness recants his earlier identification of the prisoner. 
Relief from execution (but not conviction relief) is appropriate in this 
type of case.276 This proposal singles out death-sentenced prisoners for 
special treatment. Justice Potter Stewart first articulated the basis for this 
“death is different” approach in his concurring opinion in Furman v. 
Georgia277: 
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal 
punishment not in degree, but in kind. It is unique in its total 
irrevocability. It is unique in its rejection of rehabilitation of the 
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice. And it is unique, 
finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our 
concept of humanity.278 
Justice Souter, dissenting in Kansas v. Marsh, wrote that “a new body 
of fact must be accounted for in deciding what, in practical terms, the 
Eighth Amendment guarantees should tolerate, for the period starting in 
1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, 
in numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests.”279 
Souter suggested that the United States has entered “a period of new 
empirical argument about how ‘death is different.’”280 Since the Court 
decided Marsh in 2006, at least seventeen death-sentenced prisoners 
have been exonerated.281 This is more impressive in context: there are 
                                                     
276. The proposal to prohibit the execution of a person who establishes his probable innocence is 
based on the degree of risk that the prisoner is factually innocent. A new penalty phase would be 
geared towards whether the prisoner deserves a death sentence assuming the fact of his guilt. 
Residual doubt is not a critical—and perhaps not a permissible—element of the penalty phase. See 
Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 525 (2006). Thus, a penalty phase retrial is not an appropriate form 
of relief. 
277. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
278. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 
(1976) (“This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively 
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from 
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of 
that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (noting that the death penalty “is unique in its severity and irrevocability”). 
279. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 207 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
280. Id. at 210 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188).  
281. See Innocence: List of Those Freed from Death Row, supra note 17. The Death Penalty 
Information Center maintains a list of exonerated death row prisoners. In order to qualify for the 
list, the person must: (1) have been retried and acquitted, (2) had all charges pertaining to the case 
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only 3260 people on death row across the country,282 and approximately 
118 new people sentenced to death each year.283 
Execution relief is consistent with the Court’s capital jurisprudence, 
which emphasizes that the death penalty “is unique in its severity and 
irrevocability.”284 The Court has stated on numerous occasions that the 
Eighth Amendment requires “heightened reliability” in the 
administration of capital punishment.285 The primary way in which 
“death is different” is that the need for a closer fit between punishment 
and culpability in the capital context requires states to permit a 
defendant to introduce mitigation evidence that tends to show that a 
death sentence is too severe.286 Similarly, the need for a tighter 
culpability–punishment fit has resulted in categorically excluding some 
offenders from the possibility of a death sentence. In Atkins v. 
Virginia,287 the Court excluded mentally retarded individuals from 
capital punishment, finding that as a class mentally retarded citizens 
have “diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to 
engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the 
reactions of others.”288 In Roper v. Simmons,289 the Court held that those 
under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime are uniformly less 
culpable than adult offenders who commit murder, and thus cannot be 
subjected to capital punishment.290 If a guilty mentally retarded or 
juvenile offender possesses insufficient culpability to be executed, 
innocent people of all stripes do not possess the requisite culpability 
level. 
There also are at least four pragmatic reasons to extend the “death is 
different” jurisprudence to require that death-sentenced prisoners cannot 
                                                     
dropped, or (3) received a gubernatorial pardon on the basis of innocence. Id. Seventeen formerly 
death-sentenced inmates met those criteria between 2007 and October 28, 2010. Id. One hundred 
and forty former death row inmates have been exonerated since 1973. Id.  
282. Deborah Fins, Criminal Justice Project, Death Row U.S.A., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. 
FUND 1 (Apr. 1, 2010), http://naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Spring_2010.pdf. 
283. This number reflects the average sentence total over the five years between 2006 and 2010. 
The Death Penalty Information Center recorded 118 death sentences in 2009 and 104 death 
sentences in 2010, suggesting that the trend is towards fewer death sentences. Facts About the 
Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER (Jan. 27, 2012), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. 
284. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187. 
285. Id.; see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring). 
286. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–04 (1976). 
287. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
288. Id. at 318. 
289. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
290. Id. at 578. 
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be executed if they are probably innocent. First, the procedural 
protections afforded to capital defendants in the penalty phase of a 
capital trial do not protect against wrongfully executing a factually 
innocent person. Rather, they aim to prevent wrongfully condemning a 
person who is factually responsible for the homicide but does not 
deserve the death penalty.291 The overriding goal of the “death is 
different” jurisprudence, however, is to protect against the possibility 
that someone is undeservingly executed. No one could deserve execution 
less than someone who is factually innocent of the crime charged. The 
realizations that the problem of wrongful convictions in death penalty 
cases is more widespread than previously imaginable, and that the best 
opportunity to identify innocence is often after the trial has ended, 
militate towards adopting a “death is different” intermediate innocence 
standard. 
A second, more obvious reason to tie execution relief to a lower 
burden of proof than that required for vacating a conviction outright is 
that once the state executes the prisoner there is no further opportunity to 
develop the evidence that could have conclusively demonstrated his 
innocence. Once the prisoner presents a threshold display of probable 
innocence, the justice system should not short-circuit his ability to 
demonstrate outright innocence in the future—perhaps someone else in 
the store on the night of the shooting recorded the crime on her cellular 
phone, or perhaps technological improvements allow for enhancing the 
video that displayed the outlines of the suspect’s figure, or maybe the 
real perpetrator confesses on his deathbed. It is true that any prisoner 
might be able to present evidence of his innocence in the future. Unlike 
the vast majority of prisoners, however, the prisoner in our hypothetical 
already has demonstrated that he is probably innocent. Another 
difference is that for death-sentenced prisoners, unlike all other 
prisoners, the opportunity for future remedy (including executive 
commutation) has a time limit.292 In this sense, death is categorically 
different from even the harshest non-capital sentence. 
A third reason to adopt a lower standard for execution relief is that 
                                                     
291. See, e.g., Oregon v. Guzek, 546 U.S. 517, 524 (2006) (rejecting a due process right to 
introduce evidence of residual doubt in the penalty phase of a capital trial because the Eighth 
Amendment right to introduce mitigation evidence is limited to types of “evidence [tending] to 
show how, not whether, the defendant committed the crime” (emphasis in original)). 
292. Blackstone identified the same problem in the insanity context: “[I]f after judgment, [a 
prisoner] becomes of insane memory, execution shall be stayed,” because “had the prisoner been of 
sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.” 4 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at *24, quoted in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 407 (1986). In 
other words, prisoners who are insane might not be able to allege new evidence (e.g., new evidence 
of innocence) that would cause a judge to stay an execution. 
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capital cases appear to result in more wrongful convictions per capita 
than non-capital cases.293 Error is more likely to occur—and more likely 
to remain uncorrected—in homicide cases because there (often) is no 
surviving victim to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution.294 
Moreover, the heinous nature of the crime heightens fear and other 
emotional responses. The emotionally charged climate drives the feeling 
that the police need to “get” someone. It also might cause jurors to feel 
less comfortable labeling any doubt that they feel as “reasonable.” 
Additionally, death-qualified juries—which are the only ones that decide 
capital cases—are more conviction-prone than ordinary juries.295 The 
same dynamics could play out as post-conviction courts or parole boards 
analyze these cases. In Troy Davis’ case, for example, absent physical 
evidence, it is impossible to know for certain that Davis was innocent. 
Nonetheless, a parade of witnesses came forward to disavow their trial 
testimony.296 There is evidence that the alternative suspect confessed on 
multiple occasions. By contrast, if Davis had been convicted of tax 
evasion rather than killing a police officer, the pragmatic obstacles to 
releasing him on the same evidence may have been considerably 
diminished. Uniform standards should provide uniform results across 
cases. But emotionally charged cases change the perceived risk calculus. 
A lower threshold for execution relief protects against that possibility in 
close cases. 
The final pragmatic reason to extend the “death is different” notion to 
probably innocent defendants is that society has a decreased interest in 
obtaining an execution as opposed to keeping a convicted prisoner 
incarcerated. The marginal benefit of executions is minimal compared to 
the high cost of executing an innocent person. First, incarcerating a 
person who commits a homicide satisfies the public safety prerogative. 
As Professor Mark Cunningham explains, “[m]odern prison capabilities 
provide for super-maximum confinement . . . render[ing] the probability 
                                                     
293. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 210 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Samuel R. 
Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
523 (2005)). But see id. at 198 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The dissent’s suggestion that capital 
defendants are especially liable to suffer from the lack of 100% perfection in our criminal justice 
system is implausible. Capital cases are given especially close scrutiny at every level, which is why 
in most cases many years elapse before the sentence is executed.” (emphasis in original)). 
294. See Marsh, 548 U.S. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting) (speculating that a disproportionate 
number of exonerations stem from murder convictions “probably owing to the combined difficulty 
of investigating without help from the victim, intense pressure to get convictions in homicide cases, 
and the corresponding incentive for the guilty to frame the innocent”).  
295. See Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-
Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 121–32 (1984). 
296. See supra text accompanying note 210. 
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of serious assaultive misconduct negligible.”297 Indeed, nearly all death-
eligible prisoners refrain from committing assaultive behavior while 
incarcerated.298 Former death-row inmates do not commit assaultive 
behavior at a higher rate than their originally life-sentenced 
counterparts.299 Second, there is no reliable evidence that executions 
produce a greater deterrent effect than a sentence of life without parole. 
Four-fifths of leading criminologists surveyed in 2009 agreed that the 
death penalty is not a deterrent.300 Nearly six out of ten police chiefs 
agreed.301 Third, if Blackstone is correct, the risk of executing someone 
who is not culpable outweighs the additional retributive effect gained 
from executing a culpable prisoner.302 Finally, the cost to the justice 
system’s credibility that would result from the execution of a factually 
innocent person is not worth the benefit of executing a prisoner who has 
already demonstrated his probable innocence. 
One objection to the execution-relief portion of the proposal is that 
creating a lower evidentiary bar for avoiding the execution of a person 
who is probably innocent reduces the incentive for courts to provide 
relief from the conviction itself, regardless of the strength of the 
innocence showing.303 Under this “freedom or bust” approach, an 
                                                     
297. Mark Cunningham et al., Capital Jury Decision-Making: The Limitations of Predictions of 
Future Violence, 15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 223, 228 (2009). 
298. Id. at 236–38. 
299. Id. at 242–43. 
300. Michael L. Radelet & Traci L. Lacock, Do Executions Lower Homicides Rates?: The Views 
of Leading Criminologists, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489, 501, 504 (2009) (concluding from 
survey data of criminologists that “the vast majority of the world’s top criminologists believe that 
the empirical research has revealed the deterrence hypothesis for a myth”). Harvard Law Professor 
Cass Sunstein recently took the position that “the best reading of the accumulated data is that they 
do not establish a deterrent effect of the death penalty.” Id. at 496 n.45. 
301. Richard Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in a Time of Economic 
Crisis: National Poll of Police Chiefs Puts Capital Punishment at Bottom of Law Enforcement 
Priorities, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER 1, 10 (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf (finding that fifty-seven percent of 
police chiefs agreed with the statement: “The death penalty does little to prevent violent crimes 
because perpetrators rarely consider the consequences when engaged in violence” (emphasis in 
original)). 
302. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at *358 (“[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, 
than that one innocent suffer.”). 
303. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *40 n.24 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010) 
(citing Brandon L. Garrett, Exoneree Post-Conviction Data, VA. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/judging_innocence/exonerees_postconviction_dna_t
esting.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (finding that prosecutors opposed efforts to vacate the 
sentence in 9.8% of 225 DNA-based exonerations)). Another objection is that parole boards and 
governors are meant to—and do—prevent wrongful executions via clemency procedures. In his 
Herrera dissent, Justice Blackmun discredited the notion that clemency, which is not a legal remedy 
to protect a substantive right but rather an act of grace from the executive branch, could substitute 
for freestanding innocence claims. He observed: “The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to 
withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
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innocent person is more likely to spend the rest of his life incarcerated 
than if the only avenue to federal habeas relief was through reversing the 
conviction and not the sentence. The first thing to note is the absence of 
a current articulated freestanding innocence claim, despite the passage of 
nearly two decades since the Court decided Herrera. It is highly 
plausible that both the Court and Congress are reluctant to craft a 
freestanding innocence claim that results in vacating the underlying 
conviction except where the prisoner presents near-conclusive evidence 
of his innocence. Of course, successful rehabilitation or good prison 
behavior are not preconditions to being ruled factually innocent. The 
legitimate fear of releasing someone who committed a murder, and the 
antecedent fear that such a person might commit another violent crime, 
drives this inaction. In the same vein, in cases where evidence of 
probable but not conclusive innocence exists, and there is no underlying 
claim to litigate under Schlup, the prisoner is not as likely to obtain 
executive clemency (e.g., non-judicial relief from the death sentence). 
Thus, intermediate relief has an impact on cases such as Troy Davis’s or 
Cameron Todd Willingham’s, where the possibility of a wrongful 
execution is the greatest. For these reasons, adding an intermediate 
standard could result in saving more factually innocent death-sentenced 
prisoners from the execution chamber than would a single standard. 
There is also a likely element of belief that life on death row is not 
worth living, which drives the “freedom or bust” approach. There is, 
however, an unquantifiable difference between execution and being 
alive in prison. The relationship between the two approximates the 
relationship between a murder victim and a rape victim that the Court 
discussed in Coker v. Georgia304: “Life is over for the victim of the 
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, 
                                                     
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 440 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). Justice Blackmun’s concerns are most 
readily apparent in cases that present factual claims that are impossible to prove with certainty. 
Indeed, in the Willingham case, even after his execution, Texas Governor Rick Perry has actively 
obstructed attempts to clear Willingham’s name. See, e.g., Lila Shapiro, Gov. Rick Perry: Cameron 
Todd Willingham “Was A Monster,” HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/14/gov-rick-perry-cameron-to_n_321710.html (reporting 
that “[Governor] Perry stifled a panel reviewing Willingham’s execution by abruptly removing 
three people from the group 48 hours before the review, forcing its cancellation”); Paul Thornton, 
Editorial, Rick Perry: The Presidential Candidate Dogged by a Ghost?, L.A.TIMES (June 14, 2011, 
3:40 PM), http://opinion.latimes.com/opinionla/2011/06/rick-perry-the-presidential-candidate-who-
executed-an-innocent-man.html (reporting Perry’s potential decision to seek nomination as the 
Republican candidate for President in 2012 and noting that the Cameron Todd Willingham case 
might not sit well with voters).  
304. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
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but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.”305 An innocent 
prisoner serving life without parole is still able to visit with his family, 
to develop meaningful relations with other inmates or with pen pals, and 
to maintain hope that he will one day obtain outright release. Moreover, 
state penitentiaries often offer inmates serving life sentences 
opportunities to take educational courses, maintain employment within 
the prison, or have contact visits with friends or relatives that often are 
not available (or available on a greatly reduced basis) to death row 
inmates.306 And, again, the prisoner who obtains intermediate relief is 
still able to marshal stronger evidence of his innocence and return to 
court in an attempt to meet the stricter threshold for conviction-relief. 
This is not a possibility for someone who already has been executed. 
3.  Gateway Innocence Claims 
In order to align gateway innocence claims with the underlying 
concern for innocence protection, courts should review a gateway 
innocence claim despite being procedurally defaulted if, and only if, it 
appears that the deprivation of the constitutional right itself interfered 
with an accurate determination of criminal liability. For instance, a 
petitioner may present enough evidence to meet the innocence-centered 
exception to a procedural default on the underlying claim that his 
counsel was ineffective during jury selection for failing to object under 
Batson v. Kentucky.307 In that case, the federal court should not review 
the otherwise defaulted claim because there is not a direct nexus 
between the elimination of a particular juror and the conviction of a 
factually innocent person.308 On the other hand, if under the same 
showing of innocence, a person alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failure to investigate a credible alibi witness, the petitioner should 
receive a determination on the merits of the otherwise defaulted claim. 
Failure to investigate credible leads that a client is innocent directly and 
                                                     
305. Id. at 598. 
306. See, e.g., Christopher Reinhart, OLR Research Report: Prison Conditions for Death Row 
and Life Without Parole Inmates, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-0178.htm (comparing restrictions and privileges for death row 
and life without parole prisoners in Connecticut).  
307. 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of race 
discrimination against even a single prospective juror).  
308. It is worth noting that the Court views Batson claims as affecting the integrity of the trial 
itself, and thus Batson errors are not subject to harmless error analysis. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 
U.S. 159, 169 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Nonetheless, the step from the composition of a 
jury to the conviction of an innocent defendant requires more mental flexibility than the fact that 
trial counsel failed to interview a critical alibi witness who has now come forward or the 
prosecution failed to turn over a piece of evidence that appears to point towards a different suspect. 
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obviously undermines the public confidence that the underlying 
conviction is correct. It also damages the conviction’s legitimacy 
because the petitioner would have had to make a gateway showing of 
innocence to reach the point at which the court will review the 
ineffective assistance claim. The difference between the two examples is 
that the person who shows plausible innocence and a malfunctioning of 
a traditional innocence-protection mechanism is on average more likely 
to be factually innocent.309 
One objection is that distinguishing between “legal” and “actual” 
innocence is detrimental to both types of petitioners because most 
“actually innocent” prisoners will not have received a constitutionally 
sound trial.310 The point that procedural error and factual innocence 
often go hand in hand is a strong one. Indeed, the link between those two 
concerns is what drives the proposal to create a more forgiving gateway 
innocence standard. However, eradicating the distinction between 
“actual” and “legal” innocence will not provide an adequate remedy. 
Justice Robert Jackson’s analogy is relevant here: “He who must search 
a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the 
needle is not worth the search.”311 Equating innocence claims with 
traditional claims of trial error has the disadvantage of equating the 
claims of those most likely to be innocent with the rest of the 17,000 
federal habeas petitions filed by state court prisoners each year.312 
Moreover, by actively removing what makes innocence attractive to 
ordinary citizens, their representatives, and to judges—that is, the 
difference between factual innocence and “innocence” by procedural 
error—it is very possible that there would be a net decrease in relief 
granted to wrongfully convicted prisoners. It is true that in some cases 
where an underlying Brady or Strickland claim occurred, that error 
deprives the prisoner of presenting evidence of innocence. The difficulty 
is that there is no ex ante way to separate those claims from routine 
                                                     
309. I do not endeavor here to create an exhaustive list of those fundamental types of trial error 
that would fall under the exception and those that would not. The point is simply that if there is to 
be an innocence exception to procedural default, then the underlying claim should be of the variety 
that is likely to alter the fact-finder’s ability to reliably assess guilt. 
310. See Hughes, supra note 60, at 1106–10 (discussing how “actual” and “legal” innocence 
interweaves in practice, and using the Troy Davis case to explain the point).  
311. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
312. Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Justice, Too Much and Too Expensive, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 15, 2011, at Opinion 8 (“State prisoners convicted of non-capital offenses file more than 
17,000 habeas corpus petitions in federal court each year,” but “[o]nly a tiny fraction of these 
habeas petitioners — estimated at less than four-tenths of one percent — obtain any kind of relief, 
which is usually a new trial, sentencing or appeal, after which they may be sent back to prison.”); 
see also NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT (2011). 
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Brady or Strickland claims. Demonstrating a reasonable probability of 
actual innocence provides the only administrable nexus (short of 
deprioritizing actual innocence) between the traditional trial error and 
the conclusion that a person is innocent of the crime. On the margins, the 
courts will likely find and remedy more inaccurate guilt determinations 
if they use the gateway innocence sorting device than if they treat all 
petitions alleging a constitutional error the same.313 
Lowering the burden of proof for gateway innocence claims and 
restricting the types of claims to those most likely to “interweave” with 
innocence is a more targeted route. In exchange for limiting the types of 
underlying claims to those likely to have an effect on the accuracy of the 
trial verdict, it is necessary to lower the quantum of evidence that a 
petitioner must put forward to travel through the innocence gateway. It is 
helpful to begin by examining the theoretical underpinnings for 
procedural restrictions on federal habeas review before discussing both 
parts of the proposed alteration to gateway innocence claims. 
Judge Henry Friendly and Professor Paul Bator penned the two most 
influential contemporary theories of federal habeas review.314 Both 
accounts figure prominently in the Court’s creation of procedural default 
rules and Congress’s codification of the same.315 In the seminal article, 
Is Innocence Irrelevant?, Judge Friendly wrote, “the one thing almost 
                                                     
313. A strong objection to this trade-off is that it gives state actors an incentive to cut 
constitutional corners. My criticism of this position is limited to the posttrial context. Plans to divert 
pretrial funding or to assign the best lawyers or the most hours to someone who appears to be 
innocent is the wrong path to travel down. To begin with, defense lawyers likely are not better able 
to predict innocence in cases where their client claims innocence than are jurors or judges. In fact, 
attorney knowledge of past bad acts (or even the client’s unfavorable personality characteristics or 
habits) might color the view of a client in a way that a juror without that knowledge is not 
susceptible. Moreover, stamping out all constitutional error at the trial and direct review stages is 
critical for deterrence and for doctrinal development. To a lesser extent federal review is also 
necessary to achieve the same goals—for instance, where a state court refuses to faithfully apply a 
federal constitutional rule or applies it in an objectively unreasonable manner. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(1) (2006). As I have argued in other places, however, the U.S. Supreme Court should fill 
some of the void by extending the use of its power to grant, vacate, and remand certiorari petitions 
that do not present novel questions of law, but do call out for the Court to set boundaries (or to show 
that the boundaries it has already set have teeth). Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death 
Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REV. 227, 249 (2012). These deterrence and enforcement 
rationales lose their force as state prisoners travel farther through the federal court system, and are 
often overcome by competing finality, comity and judicial resource interests. Prisoners who present 
claims of factual innocence avoid most of these pitfalls, and thus keeping “legal” and “factual” 
innocence separate provides better odds that the primary value of innocence-protection is 
adequately enforced. 
314. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 142 (1971); Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for 
State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). 
315. Kovarsky, supra note 38, at 334 (“Professor Bator and Judge Friendly produced landmark 
scholarship that . . . shaped the conservative position on habeas for the next forty years.”). 
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never suggested on collateral attack is that the prisoner was innocent of 
the crime.”316 Judge Friendly emphasized the tremendous amount of 
resources that federal courts spend reviewing frivolous habeas 
petitions.317 To decrease the influx of frivolous petitions and increase the 
ability of courts to remedy meritorious petitions, Friendly argued that 
federal habeas review of state court judgments should be restricted to 
cases where the petitioner is able to demonstrate a colorable claim that 
he is factually innocent of the underlying crime.318 Judge Friendly 
defined “colorable” as one where the appellate court believed there to be 
a “fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, . . . the trier of the 
facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.”319 
Rather than using innocence as the touchstone for habeas review, 
Professor Bator believed that the focus should be on whether the state 
courts provided the prisoner with adequate process for raising federal 
constitutional claims.320 Bator’s focus on the richness of the process 
rather than on the substantive question of innocence derived partly from 
his belief that innocence is a question whose answer often is unknowable 
in an absolute sense.321 Due to these epistemological limits, Professor 
Bator believed that the correctness of the proceeding’s outcome is 
unlikely to improve with relitigation.322 He argued that relitigating an 
issue when it was adequately resolved the first time not only wastes 
resources, but also interferes with the law’s ability to achieve its 
deterrent and educational aims and restricts the ability of the prisoner to 
                                                     
316. Friendly, supra note 314, at 145. 
317. Id. at 148–49. 
318. Id. at 142 (“My thesis is that, with a few important exceptions, convictions should be subject 
to collateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his constitutional plea with a colorable 
claim of innocence.”). 
319. Id. at 160. 
320. Bator, supra note 314, at 455 (asserting that “a process fairly and rationally adapted to the 
task of finding the facts and applying the law should not be repeated” and concluding that the main 
purpose of federal review of state conviction should be to determine “whether previous process was 
meaningful process, that is, whether the conditions and tools of inquiry were such as to assure a 
reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found and the law correctly applied” (emphasis 
omitted)).  
321. Id. at 447 (“[T]he concept of ‘freedom from error’ must eventually include a notion that 
some complex of institutional processes is empowered definitively to establish whether or not there 
was error, even though in the very nature of things no such processes can give us ultimate 
assurances . . . .” (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added)). 
322. Id. at 451 (asking why “if a proceeding is held to determine the facts and law in a case, and 
the processes used in that proceeding are fitted to the task in a manner not inferior to those which 
would be used in a second proceeding, so that one cannot demonstrate that relitigation would not 
merely consist of repetition and second-guessing, why should not the first proceeding ‘count’? Why 
should we duplicate effort? . . . What seems so objectionable is second-guessing merely for the sake 
of second-guessing, in the service of the illusory notion that if we only try hard enough we will find 
the ‘truth.’”). 
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start the process of rehabilitation.323 In light of these concerns, Bator 
credited to “unreasoned anxiety” support for most types of federal 
habeas review of state convictions.324 
Both Judge Friendly and Professor Bator placed enormous trust in the 
ability of the trial process to accurately weed out the innocent. Both 
agreed that the state court appellate process (as a general rule) provides 
adequate protections for the review of trial verdicts. They separated 
paths at the question of innocence, however. Friendly believed 
identifying the factually innocent during post-conviction proceedings to 
be possible, but exceedingly rare. Bator believed that innocence in the 
absolute sense is largely unknowable and that we are likely to get it as 
right as we ever shall on a first pass at the question. Our contemporary 
understanding of wrongful convictions, our realization that even 
traditional forms of evidence are not as reliable as we imagined them to 
be, and our ability to test some types of evidence more reliably as time 
passes, each demand reconsideration of the fundamental assumptions 
that Friendly and Bator made. 
Bator argued that the idea of adequate process might now include as a 
matter of course (rather than as an exceptional departure) post-
conviction reliability testing where a petitioner is able to present an 
adequate quantum of proof that he is factually innocent of the crime 
charged. There is ample reason to believe that Bator would support this 
added point of procedural protection if he accepted the underlying 
premise that there is a sufficiently strong ability to determine innocence 
posttrial so that the extra step would increase overall functioning. 
Indeed, he wrote: 
I want to be careful to stress that I do not counsel a smug 
acceptance of injustice merely because it is disturbing to worry 
whether injustice has been done. What I do seek is a general 
procedural system which does not cater to a perpetual and 
unreasoned anxiety that there is a possibility that error has been 
made in every criminal case in the legal system.325 
Bator argued that adequate process meant process “fitted” to provide 
a “reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found.”326 Given the 
plain and relatively frequent possibility that scientific evidence 
discovered post-conviction casts fundamental doubt on a conviction, it 
                                                     
323. Id. at 452. 
324. Id. at 453. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. at 451, 455 (emphasizing that a process was full and rational where it provided a 
“reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found, and the law correctly applied”).  
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seems reasonable to conclude that the trial process is not reasonably 
fitted to the task of determining the most important fact: innocence. 
Moreover, Bator opposed routine federal court review of state 
convictions because it would “merely consist of repetition and second-
guessing.”327 
In the context of a gateway innocence exception, however, the odds 
are best that federal court relitigation does more than second-guess state 
court judgment. The claims most likely to proceed on these grounds—
ineffective assistance of counsel and failure to comply with discovery 
obligations—present politically difficult questions for judges (and 
especially state court judges). These claims strike at core ethical 
responsibilities and a judgment against a prosecutor who did not turn 
over evidence or a defense lawyer who did not perform adequately is a 
personal rebuke from one member of an often tight-knit legal 
community against another member of the same community. Moreover, 
in instances where the underlying legal defect was litigated before the 
discovery of new evidence, the disincentive to grant relief on a 
borderline constitutional error is strongest in the most heinous cases, 
which are exactly the type of cases where wrongful convictions are most 
likely to occur. Federal courts are not perfect. However, unlike elected 
state judges, they are largely immune from political consequences.328 
They are also comparatively more immune from the interpersonal 
consequences that lurk in the shadows of these types of cases. The same 
cannot always be said for state courts, however, as some former state 
prosecutors become state judges who review cases from the same 
prosecutorial district, and other former prosecutors become defense 
lawyers who try cases in the same district.329 
On the other hand, the infrequency with which habeas relief is granted 
today, combined with the increased frequency with which innocent 
prisoners are being exonerated, seems to amplify Judge Friendly’s 
argument that habeas should be tied to underlying claims of innocence. 
Thus, Judge Friendly’s “reasonable probability standard” better suits the 
gateway innocence exception to procedurally defaulted claims. Under 
                                                     
327. Id. at 451. 
328. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (providing that federal “Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their 
Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office”).  
329. This logic also applies to freestanding actual innocence claims presented on federal habeas 
review. If the state court did not consider all of the new evidence of innocence—even if discovered 
outside of the traditional motion for a new trial timeframe or otherwise procedurally defaulted—
then there is every reason to believe—given the number of post-conviction exonerations and the 
nature of most of the evidence that drives post-conviction innocence claims—that the process is 
insufficient to determine innocence with a reasonable probability. 
09 - WLR March 2012 Smith Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/8/2012 11:17 AM 
2012] CONSTITUTIONAL INNOCENCE PROTECTION 201 
 
Schlup, a prisoner who presents a forty-nine percent likelihood of 
innocence (say, through new biological evidence) is not able to obtain 
review of an underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claim even if 
the Strickland claim is based on something such as the trial lawyer 
failing to locate a credible alibi witness that is no longer locatable. As 
the example demonstrates, the prevailing probably innocent standard 
(and, by extension, any higher standard required under AEDPA) does 
not adequately reflect the paramount value of innocence-protection in 
light of our contemporary situation. 
It is also important to highlight the erosion in the finality interests that 
the Court relied upon in Schlup to conclude that the balance of the 
interests supported a probable innocence standard. 330 First, a change in 
frequency with which a competing concern arises alters the relative 
weight of competing principles. We now have an idea of the frequency 
with which the innocent are convicted.331 Professor Bator and Judge 
Friendly highlighted rehabilitation, retribution, deterrence, and 
educational aims as the driving force behind the finality argument.332 
The rehabilitation process cannot begin for a person who truly is 
innocent of the crime, however. It is not possible to realize the 
retributive benefit. Society does not obtain the intended educational 
benefit from convicting an innocent person; indeed, as strong claims of 
innocence leak from the courthouse to the newsroom, the educational 
effect that occurs is that our system is both not as accurate as we might 
imagine and that the federal courts are not capable of remedying the 
most extraordinary injustice. It is difficult to argue for the guaranteed 
incapacitation of the prisoner as presenting a deterrent effect if the 
prisoner is innocent and the true perpetrator is free to commit other 
crimes. Again, these factors have always been present. The difference 
now is that the frequency with which wrongful convictions occur 
increases their relative strength. 
A truly innocent person also lacks the incentive to use gamesmanship 
to lengthen his sentence. Therefore, after limiting gateway innocence 
claims to those most likely to affect the guilt determination, those 
                                                     
330. It is also worth noting that a perceived need for finality did not bar relitigation of claims at 
the founding or at common law. See Eric M. Freedman, Dimension I: Habeas Corpus As a Common 
Law Writ, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 591, 609 n.90 (2011) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 
317 (1995)). To the contrary, prisoners generally could urge any court in the jurisdiction where he 
had been convicted to reconsider whether he was being held in violation of the Constitution. Courts 
providing successive review generally reviewed the case de novo. Id.  
331. See supra notes 14–29 and accompanying text (discussing the number of known 
exonerations—including those originally sentenced to death row—in the modern period).  
332. Bator, supra note 314, at 452; Friendly, supra note 314, at 146. 
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pursuing non-frivolous claims of trial error will have a strong positive 
incentive to discover and present evidence of innocence as soon as 
possible. Comity concerns are also at a low point once we tie underlying 
claims to those likely to impact the guilt–innocence determination. First, 
as innocence protection is the overriding value in constitutional criminal 
procedure, federal courts possess more of an interest in enforcing 
constitutional protections in this context than in any other. Second, state 
court judges often are elected. Questions of possible or probable (rather 
than near-certain) innocence entail the possible release of a person 
whom the local community might believe to be guilty (often of a 
gruesome crime) on what might be perceived as a constitutional 
technicality. Thus, gateway innocence claims are the least likely of the 
innocent claims to cut through the political nature of state court judging. 
The final and strongest interest against lowering the standard for 
gateway innocence claims is that, by their nature, gateway claims are the 
most likely of the innocence claims to needlessly deplete judicial 
resources. Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann estimate that 
sixty to seventy prisoners receive federal habeas relief each year, despite 
more than 17,000 petitions filed.333 Although most of these petitions do 
not use innocence as a gateway, the miniscule number of petitions 
granted relief of any kind is informative. By limiting the types of claims 
eligible for the gateway exception, however, there is reason to believe 
that the total number of petitioners seeking the gateway exception will 
drop. Indeed, it is more likely that prisoners respond to the decreased 
availability of claims than to a fluctuation in the requisite quantum of 
proof, because the latter is far more difficult for a petitioner to determine 
ex ante, especially in light of their subjective bias. 
In any event, the number of innocence claims raised on federal habeas 
is comparatively small. This dicta from Schlup remains valid: 
Claims of actual innocence pose less of a threat to scarce 
judicial resources and to principles of finality and comity than 
do claims that focus solely on the erroneous imposition of the 
death penalty. Though challenges to the propriety of imposing a 
sentence of death are routinely asserted in capital cases, 
experience has taught us that a substantial claim that 
constitutional error has caused the conviction of an innocent 
person is extremely rare.334 
Federal courts might further reduce the burden of innocence claims by 
enacting a procedural rule that requires reviewing first the factual basis 
                                                     
333. See Hoffmann & King, supra note 312.  
334. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.  
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of the innocence claim. This would allow courts to quickly discard 
claims that do not come close to the prevailing standard before moving 
to the substance of the petition. It is also worth considering that even 
under the procedural obstacles that AEDPA imposes on habeas 
petitioners generally, courts do not spend less time adjudicating 
petitions. They simply spend less time adjudicating the merits and more 
time navigating the procedural maze.335 These factors, considered 
together, warrant a reduction in the quantum of proof necessary to pass 
through the innocence gateway.336 
CONCLUSION 
Recognizing that trial is no longer the center of gravity for protecting 
innocent people entangled in the criminal justice system, this Article has 
grounded freestanding innocence claims in the federal Constitution. 
First, it documented that protecting the innocent is a foundational 
constitutional value. Although at the time of the founding and until 
recent times the trial possessed a monopoly on the determination of guilt 
or innocence, today innocence is often determined with a high degree of 
accuracy during the pretrial process and also posttrial after the discovery 
of new evidence (or the advent of new technology that allows for fresh 
examination of old evidence). This dislocation of the trial as the 
definitive time and place to determine innocence drives a corresponding 
change in the scope of our evolving Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
The functional differences in how and where innocence is best 
determined, as well as the heightened awareness that wrongful 
convictions regularly occur, warrant reweighing the competing interests 
in obtaining substantively accurate guilt determinations and prioritizing 
individual justice versus the societal interests in finality, comity, and 
judicial economy. Doing so reveals a prisoner’s right to obtain a posttrial 
determination of his criminal liability in cases where he is able to make a 
sufficiently strong allegation that the fact-finder convicted him at trial 
despite his factual innocence. 
Specifically, this Article has proposed that the Constitution now 
requires a posttrial determination of innocence in cases where a 
petitioner presents a threshold showing of innocence. In cases where a 
                                                     
335. See KING & HOFFMANN , supra note 312, at 79–80. 
336. These same factors—when transferred into the context of freestanding innocence claims—
warrant congressional (or judicial, within the space of AEDPA, or after a determination that 
AEDPA does not apply) reduction in the ordinarily applicable deference to state court judgments on 
such claims. 
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petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence of innocence the 
Constitution requires vacating the prisoner’s sentence. In a circumstance 
where a death-sentenced petitioner presents probable innocence, the 
Constitution—under the death is different framework—requires that the 
prisoner not be executed. Finally, the shift in our understanding of 
wrongful convictions, and the corresponding knowledge that innocence 
is sometimes more reliably determined posttrial, counsels towards 
lowering the quantum of proof—from probable innocence to a 
reasonable probability of innocence—necessary to obtain relief from 
procedurally defaulted claims. It is necessary to limit the nature of 
claims that are able to proceed through the innocence gateway to those 
most likely to impact the determination of guilt or innocence. Taken 
together, these three steps reduce the likelihood that an innocent person 
will be executed or remain incarcerated. 
 
